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Managerial Incentives and Firm Survival 
Abstract  
We find that IPO firms with generously compensated CEOs and large pay disparities in the 
boardroom have lower failure rates and longer survival time in the periods following the offering. 
Economically, an interquartile change in the distribution of CEO pay (pay gap) results, on average, 
in a reduction of the failure risk probability by 21.81% (20.55%). The relationship between CEO 
pay and IPO survival is strengthened among firms with lower agency conflicts, while the link 
between pay gap and IPO survival is pronounced when CEO succession planning is more 
important. Both measures of managerial pay are associated with lower information asymmetry, 
better valuation, and superior operating performance in the post-IPO market. The results are robust 
to alternative interpretations and additional tests. 
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1. Introduction 
“Compensation is not the work of a cartel, but it is light years from being an ideal market” 
[The Economist, 2016]  
The dramatic rise in executive pay witnessed in U.S. public firms over the last decades has 
fueled an intense debate over the suitability of executive compensation arrangements. Arguably, the 
litmus test of an effective compensation program is whether it provides sufficient incentives to 
attract, retain, and motivate qualified managers to perform in accordance with the long-term 
objectives of shareholders. This concept, known as “pay for performance”, reflects the degree to 
which executive rewards are correlated with financial outcomes that benefit shareholders, and 
while it is straightforward, existing findings on the relationship between executive pay and 
performance of publicly traded companies are mixed (Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 2013; Edmans et al., 
2017). Additionally, this research stream is largely directed towards large, established corporations. 
Missing from the discussion, however, is empirical evidence on the efficacy of compensation 
practices in the context of entrepreneurial, fast-growing firms.  
In this study, we endeavor to inform this debate by studying the implications of executive 
pay on the most entrepreneurial setting, Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). While the IPO setting 
constitutes a transformational organization event marking the start of a destabilizing and critical 
period in the evolution of a firm, it represents the first time that private firms attempt to establish 
formal compensation schemes (Filatotchev and Allcock, 2013).
2
 This provides a unique 
opportunity to examine whether compensation incentive schemes sufficiently motivate the CEO 
and the top management team to navigate successfully the transition from private to public 
ownership. Importantly, it has the potential to yield sharper insights about the pay-performance 
link. As Baker and Gompers (2003) argue, evaluating the effectiveness of governance structures is 
more beneficial around corporate events such as an IPO rather than in calendar time, since 
governance features in calendar time are as much a consequence of past performance. Since 
compensation practices are a central aspect of governance design, in addition to mature public 
firms, it is fundamentally important to evaluate separately the effectiveness of compensation 
incentives on newly public corporations (Gao and Jain, 2011).
3
 
Towards this end, we utilize a comprehensive sample of US IPOs by constructing a unique 
hand collecting data-set that explores variation in the compensation arrangements of all senior 
                                                          
2
 Using survey evidence, Larcker and Tayan (2018) document that a typical start-up becomes serious about developing 
a compensation system (by increasing the reliance on external advice, peer-group assessments, and a formal disclosure 
process through the proxy) only as a part of a plan to eventually complete an IPO. 
3
 IPOs are also crucial inputs for the healthy development of capital markets and the aggregate economy (Fama and 
French, 2004; Doidge et al., 2013; Bhattacharya et al., 2015). Hence, the extent to which compensation systems are a 
determinant of a vibrant IPO market provides further justification to our focus of investigation. 
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members prior to the offering (hereafter, managerial or executive pay). The advantage of this 
approach is that it considers the pay distribution of the whole management team. This permits us to 
examine not only the implications about the chief executive (absolute CEO pay), but also to 
evaluate the critiques of the growing disparity between the compensation of the CEO and the next 
tier of executive officers (relative CEO pay). Accordingly, we raise the following question: does 
the level and composition of remuneration contracts in IPOs elicit the appropriate effort by senior 
management, or is it a symptom of agency conflicts?  
To answer this question, we employ a salient measure of long-term performance, namely 
firm survival, defined as the incidence of delisting within five years after the IPO. Unlike more 
narrowly defined accounting or financial performance measures, firm survival captures the 
aggregate effect of all positive and negative factors influencing firm outcomes (Chadwick et al., 
2016). In this respect, it encompasses all channels (either risk– or return-related) through which the 
CEO and other top executives might affect corporate viability (Jain and Kini, 2000). Most 
importantly, it acknowledges the possibility of IPO firms having a different objective function than 
their seasoned counterparts, since they are generally more concerned with their ability to attract 
capital from financial markets rather than demonstrating a stream of positive profits (Klepper, 
2002). 
Using hazard functions to assess the survival profile of IPO issuers, we obtain a novel 
empirical finding: IPO firms with either generously compensated CEOs or large pay disparities 
have a lower probability of failure. Economically, firms with CEO pay (pay gaps) in the 75
th
 
percentile have a failure risk that is, on average, 21.81% (20.55%) lower than the failure risk of 
firms with CEO pay (pay gaps) in the 25
th
 percentile. Notably, these results are primarily driven by 
the equity-based components of pay (stock and option award, and other long-term incentive 
elements) rather than cash-based components (salary and bonus). This suggests that, an important 
objective of executive compensation arrangements of private firms that are about to go public, is to 
motivate managers to undertake long-term actions that minimize the risk of premature delisting. 
The incidence of delisting takes place in our data after we observe the pay-setting practices 
of IPO issuers. This implies that it is unlikely that our analysis suffers from endogeneity concerns. 
However, the determination of the level and the structure of compensation packages is a voluntary 
choice made by firms. Hence, drawing causal inferences is not straightforward for various reasons. 
One reason is that our estimates may be biased due to omitted fixed or time-varying variables that 
affect both our executive pay measures and firm survival in a similar manner. This implies that 
decisions on executive pay design and corporate policies are not predetermined or independent; 
rather they are usually made simultaneously. Another reason is endogenous firm-CEO matching 
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based on unobservable or observable differences between firms with high versus low managerial 
incentives. It might be the case, for example, that firms select optimally managers and design their 
compensation in the anticipation of going public or conditional on their preferences towards risk 
(Chang and Hong, 2019). Therefore, firms that aim to minimize the incidence of delisting may 
choose to hire a CEO with conservative management style for this purpose. This introduces 
selection bias and raises the possibility not only for the existence of reverse causality, but also for a 
sign opposite of the hypothesized causal effect. 
To deal effectively with time-invariant omitted firm and CEO characteristics, ideally, we 
would like to employ fixed effect specifications. Since every privately-owned firm goes public only 
once, this is infeasible in our context. The closest substitute is to consider an array of additional 
variables that can be viewed as reasonably stable around the IPO process. These variables allow us 
to control for the quality of compensation committees, firm complexity, executive talent, risk 
aversion, career concerns, and type of managerial experience. We find that appropriate controls for 
these factors do not dampen the effect of executive pay on IPO survival.  
To address the time-varying omitted variable bias, and hence with spurious correlation 
between managerial pay and other unobservable factors that affect the nature of the pay-setting 
process, we implement an instrumental variable (IV) approach  that exploits the fact that firms set 
compensation policies based on practices of industry peer groups. Kale et al. (2009) argue that, 
while industry practices directly affect a firm’s pay design process, there are no economic reasons 
to expect that they affect firm performance. The instrumental variable estimates suggest that 
endogeneity concerns due to unobservable factors do not drive our findings.  
Another way to address unobservable time-varying heterogeneity and the related selection 
bias arising from endogenous firm-CEO matching is to consider an indirect test: in which cases the 
selection effect would be stronger than the direct incentive effect of executive pay measures? If the 
selection effect dominates the treatment effect of managerial pay, then its impact would be 
pronounced for CEOs closest to their appointment (Hirshleifer et al., 2012). We find the opposite 
pattern: the effect of executive pay is stronger for long-tenured managers, indicating that selection 
bias based on unobserved personal characteristics correlated with pay is an unlikely driver of our 
results.  
Finally, we attempt to deal with endogenous firm-CEO matching due to observable 
characteristics. Using a matching estimation analysis that minimizes the distributional CEO and 
firm differences between firms with high versus low managerial incentives, we continue to find a 
negative relationship between executive pay and IPO failure. Overall, our results suggest that at 
least part of the executive pay-firm survival relationship is causal. This is intuitive because even if 
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the board endogenously selects a CEO by management style, the CEO should be sufficiently 
incentivized to implement the intended policy. 
A natural conclusion that emerges is the following: if managerial pay in IPOs is indeed 
structured under shareholder value maximization considerations, its impact on firm survival should 
vary in ways predictable by the efficient contracting camp. To examine this proposition, we follow 
a sample partition approach, and find that the effectiveness of CEO remuneration packages is 
pronounced in samples of firms with low agency conflicts (i.e., specialists or relatively young 
CEOs, and strong governance mechanisms), whereas the influence of CEO pay gap is strengthened 
among firms with higher likelihood of promotion (i.e., when the CEO is an outsider, generalist, and 
close to retirement).  
The lower incidence of failure achieved by firms with higher managerial pay does not 
necessarily translate into higher firm value or superior performance. It could be that managers with 
high pay are or become more conservative after the IPO to minimize the possibility of realizing 
extreme downside negative (and positive) outcomes. If this is so, the extent to which these firms 
attempt to preserve resources or cut costs, they should not be able to maintain or increase future 
performance and valuation. Our final set of tests explores these conjectures. We initially find that, 
while firms helmed by managers experience lower volatility in the IPO aftermarket, they manage to 
exhibit higher risk-adjusted stock returns and better operating performance. We also provide some 
evidence that these firms devote more resources to investment activities compared to the pre-IPO 
year. Overall, this suggests that, in our sample, high-powered incentives enable IPO issuers to 
obtain funds from the capital markets for longer periods without compromising their value 
generating capacity. 
Our paper makes contributions to both the literature and current policy debate on the 
efficacy of executive pay schemes. To begin, previous literature has explored whether 
compensation-based incentives affect either corporate performance (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; 
Bebchuk et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2013) or risk taking behavior (Kini and Williams, 2012). Such 
studies focus on various means to an end. Given that firm-survival is an all-encompassing measure, 
it offers a sharper test on the implications of compensation arrangements. Importantly, our paper 
documents that in IPOs – a contractual setting which is substantially different than that of the 
typical publicly-traded company – a meaningful part of executive compensation is largely driven 
by a competitive market for talent or optimally-set tournament incentives rather than weak boards. 
By doing so, our findings speak to the debate over the effectiveness of internal incentive structures.  
In addition, our work is related to previous studies focusing on the interrelationships 
between corporate governance and aftermarket performance of IPO firms. This line of research has 
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identified a wide range of governance mechanisms that may reduce the extent of adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems, including board characteristics (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005), the 
strategic role of founder CEOs (Certo et al., 2001; Nelson, 2003; He, 2008), and the governance 
role of early stage investors (Jain and Kini, 2000). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the 
first to establish a link between executive pay incentives (i.e., CEO compensation and CEO pay 
gap) and the long-term prospects of newly-public firms. In this regard, it adds a new dimension to 
the nascent literature concerned with the influence of governance factors on the decisions of IPO 
issuers to delist.   
 Our work is also closely related to a limited number of studies that examine the association 
between executive incentives and IPO outcomes. Lowry and Murphy (2007) and Chahine and 
Goergen (2011) consider whether IPO option grants relate to underpricing, while Certo et al. (2003) 
study the impact of options on IPO valuation. These studies focus on the price discovery process, 
and particularly, on the initial reactions of investors with regard to equity-based incentives at the 
time of the IPO. Our study differs in two primary dimensions. First, by investigating the link 
between compensation-based incentives and firm survival we acknowledge that actual ability or 
effort as reflected in the level and structure of compensation arrangements, rather than solely 
investors’ perceptions, is also relevant for ensuring the firm’s long-term viability. Second, we 
demonstrate that, not only do performance-based CEO incentives matter in assessing the prospects 
of an IPO, but also the promotion-based incentives of the lower ranked executives. In doing so, we 
provide a more complete picture of how the internal incentive structures of young ventures and 
entrepreneurial firms can serve as an effective governance tool.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The subsequent section discusses the 
hypothesis development. Section 3 provides an overview of the sample selection procedure and 
outlines the survival analysis methodology. Section 4 presents preliminary statistics and the 
empirical findings of the impact of total CEO pay and pay disparities on the probability of failure 
and time to survive of IPO firms in periods subsequent to the offering. Sections 5 and 6 provide 
several tests of robustness and endogeneity. Section 7 analyzes the differential impact of CEO 
compensation and tournament incentives across several governance and CEO characteristics. 
Section 8 presents the impact of managerial incentives on post-IPO outcomes, and Section 9 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature and Testable Predictions 
The purpose of this section is to discuss what causes the observed trends in executive pay, 
and accordingly, to analyze the potential implications in the IPO context. With this in mind, we 
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organize our discussion based on two views that dominate the executive compensation literature, 
namely, efficient contracting and managerial power. 
 
2.1 CEO Pay and Firm Survival: Efficient Contracting View 
 According to the efficient contracting view, the observed level and composition of CEO 
pay is shaped by an efficient process, which is presumably driven by competitive market forces. 
Proponents of the efficient contracting view of compensation advocate that chief executives are 
being paid the going fair-market rate. In this respect, high compensation levels reflect incentive 
structures that aim to attract or retain highly-skilled managers, reward managerial ability, and 
motivate managers to optimize firm value through higher effort and better interest alignment.  
In support of this idea, Gabaix and Landier (2008) document a strong size-pay relation and 
interpret this as an outcome of a process that reflects positive assortative mechanism, in which 
more talented CEOs match with larger firms, where their value added is greater. Chang et al. 
(2010) argue that CEO pay reflects differences in ability or at least, labor market opportunities, as 
they show that upon CEO departure, higher CEO’s pay is associated with negative stock price 
reaction and with higher probability of subsequent labor market success. Similarly, Falato et al. 
(2015) show that executive pay is positively related to proxies of reputation and managerial ability, 
Engelberg et al. (2013) suggest that a CEOs’ rolodex is important driver of pay premium, whereas 
Song and Wan (2019) document that variation in the levels of CEO compensation is more 
consistent with managerial talent rather than managerial power.   
Overall, the literature on executive compensation arrangements implies a positive 
association between higher pay and managerial ability. In addition, theoretical models provide clear 
predictions regarding the impact of compensation incentives (Edmans et al., 2017): Higher 
incentives should increase performance gross of CEO pay, whereas a structure of CEO pay closer 
to its optimum should increase firm value net of CEO pay.  
However, if there is an optimal matching based on CEO type (e.g., generalist versus 
specialist) and firm characteristics, cross-sectional differences in corporate outcomes based on CEO 
type are not easily observable. Moreover, while setting optimal incentives should increase firm 
value gross of CEO pay, this does not necessary imply a positive cross-sectional correlation 
between compensation incentives and firm value. In this optimal case scenario, by definition, no 
firm would be able to increase its value by changing its pay level. Instead, cross-sectional 
differences in optimal incentives between firms are then caused by heterogeneity in the 
fundamental inputs to the firms’ organizational process. For instance, the optimal pay level for any 
given firm may depend on its size and complexity. Alternatively, the optimal pay level depends on 
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9 
 
the number and quality of outside opportunities in labor market. Finally, the optimal pay level 
depends on the extent to which it is desirable for the firm to lower agency costs through CEO pay 
instead of investing on better governance structures (Dicks, 2012).  
As a consequence, any empirical correlation between pay and long-term firm performance 
is a mix of the causal effect of incentives and differences in fundamentals, allowing three different 
optimal selection hypotheses: 
Optimal Pay Hypothesis 1. Optimal CEO pay is positively correlated with firm survival. It 
might be argued that better managers are especially valuable for larger or high value firms. It might 
also be that these firms are especially likely to attract talented CEOs.  
Optimal Pay Hypothesis 2. Optimal CEO pay is negatively correlated with firm survival. 
A talented manager might be especially needed for low quality firms. It might also be that these 
firms are unlikely to be able to attract a good executive bench. 
Optimal Pay Hypothesis 3. Optimal CEO pay is uncorrelated with a firm’s long-term 
prospects. It might also be that the factors making high or low pay level vary in ways that are 
distributed independently of firm survival. 
 
2.2 CEO Pay and Firm Survival: Managerial Power View 
In contrast to the optimal contracting school of thought, the managerial power view asserts 
that high CEO pay does not reflect a competitive equilibrium in the market for managerial talent, 
and neither does it reflect incentives designed to optimize firm value. Instead, this view postulates 
that because managers are self-interested, they have their own agenda, which accordingly adds a 
new element to the agency problem: the ability of executives to influence both the level and 
composition of their own compensation packages, often (if not invariably) at the expense of other 
executives and the shareholders (Core et al., 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk et 
al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004).
4
   
The potentially adverse consequences of this rent extraction perspective can be quite 
substantial if one considers that the cost to shareholders may be far greater than the direct cost of 
excess compensation. This verbal argument is formally developed in the theoretical framework of 
Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2009), in which the manager can extract hidden pay, which in turn, may 
                                                          
4
 The literature has documented several ways by which CEOs can exercise their power in order to intervene in 
compensation arrangements and extract economic rents. Specifically, managerial rent extraction implies that executive 
pay will be higher mainly through forms of pay that are less observable or more difficult to value, such as stock options 
(Murphy, 2002; Hayes et al., 2012), perquisites (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), 
pensions (Stefanescu et al., 2018), and severance pay (Goldman and Huang, 2014). Consequently, even if the level of 
compensation is not excessive; it is arguably more difficult to position the widespread use of stealth compensation as an 
efficient outcome of an optimal contract. 
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either hinder shareholders’ ability to assess the managers’ contribution or reduce firm profits. What 
is perhaps more interesting in this model, is that rent extraction through executive pay can survive 
even in equilibrium, because firing is costly and any CEO replacement is also expected to extract 
rents. 
 Collectively, the managerial power view of executive compensation postulates that high 
CEO pay reflects excessive compensation and an insufficient link between CEO awards and 
performance. This reasoning yields the following hypothesis.  
Managerial Pay Hypothesis: CEO pay is negatively associated with firm survival. 
 
2.3 CEO Pay Gap and Firm Survival: Tournament-Theory  
The literature discussed above has focused predominantly on the CEO and does not usually 
take into account the incentives of the executives at the next step down the corporate ladder. In 
addition to the traditional performance-based incentives (i.e., cash and equity remuneration 
schemes), non-CEO executives respond to incentives stemming from the opportunities for 
promotion to the higher level of the corporate hierarchy – i.e., the position of CEO (Baker et al., 
1988). In such a tournament scheme, agents have strong incentives to perform well and expend 
greater effort, because the best relative performer will become the firm’s next CEO and receive the 
tournament prize, which includes higher pay, more privileges and greater prestige (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986; Murphy, 1999). 
To achieve this, non-CEO executives are motivated to stay in the firm and invest in firm-
specific-skills. Furthermore, a large tournament prize helps to build a large pool of skilled internal 
CEO candidate that reduces the risk of CEO succession and decreases the bargaining power of the 
CEO (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). Therefore, either due to greater effort or because of reduced 
agency problems, tournament incentives will increase firm’s output and reduce agency conflicts, 
thereby maximizing shareholder value. This conclusion is supported by several empirical studies 
(e.g., Lee et al., 2008; Kale et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011; Burns et al., 2017).
5
 
 As in the case of optimal levels of CEO pay, however, existing theory does not provide an 
unambiguous prediction as to how tournament-based incentives relate to firm value. In thinking 
about this question, we initially consider a case where agency costs are absent, and hence, firms 
                                                          
5
 Masulis and Zhang (2013) provide an additional explanation for the existence of large pay gaps, which is also 
consistent with the optimal contracting framework. Particularly, they argue that differences in talent, ability, and effort 
between the CEO and subordinate senior executives may also explain the observed corporate pay disparities. Consistent 
with this productivity-based explanation of pay disparities, Chang et al. (2010) find that departures of CEOs from firms 
characterized by high CEO pay disparity experience negative stock price responses around the announcement of the 
departure. They interpret this finding as consistent with the view that financial markets tend to associate high CEO pay 
disparity with high CEO managerial contribution. 
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generally set tournament incentives at the optimal level according to the relative contribution of the 
CEO in the top management team. While the compensation of the top executive team is set by the 
board without any undue influence by the CEO, no firm would be able to increase its value by 
merely changing the pay gap between the CEO and the other senior members. Still, CEO pay gap 
could relate to firm value to the extent that the optimal pay gap differs across firms. 
Optimal level of pay gap can be expected to vary among firms, depending on several 
considerations (Bebchuk et al., 2011). First, the optimal pay gap level for any given firm depends 
on the pool of candidates from which executive members are selected, as well as the efficiency of 
the labor market for executives. Second, the optimal pay gap level depends on the extent to which it 
is desirable to induce greater managerial effort through the establishment of tournament based 
incentives rather than via performance based incentives or other governance tools. Relatedly, the 
optimal pay gap level depends on the extent to which it is desirable for the board to promote a 
dominant player model based on the contribution of one but especially important player rather than 
a model that is less CEO-centric. Based on these considerations, we develop three competing 
hypotheses for CEO pay gap: 
Optimal Pay Gap Hypothesis 1. Optimal CEO pay gap is positively correlated with firm 
survival. It might be argued that a dominant player model or powerful tournament incentives are 
especially valuable for larger value firms (or with high growth opportunities). It might also be that 
these firms are especially likely to attract CEOs with scarce talent.  
Optimal Pay Gap Hypothesis 2. Optimal CEO pay gap is negatively correlated with firm 
survival. A dominant player model or powerful tournament incentives might be particularly 
effective for firms with unfavorable future prospects. It might also be that such firms are unlikely to 
be able to attract a good executive bench. 
Optimal Pay Gap Hypothesis 3. Optimal CEO pay gap is uncorrelated with long-term firm 
performance. It might be that the factors making high or low pay gap level vary in ways that are 
distributed independently of firm survival. 
 
2.4 CEO Pay Gap and Firm Survival: Managerial Power View 
Aside from what might be inefficiently high levels of absolute compensation, it is also 
important to understand why a large pay gap between the CEO and other executives might not 
serve the interests of the shareholders. Several researchers predict analytically and empirically that 
while agents may respond to tournament incentives by putting in greater effort, this behavior can 
lead to dysfunctional responses (e.g., Baker, 1992; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Existing 
literature in the finance domain suggests that stronger tournament-based incentives are associated 
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with a higher propensity to engage in fraudulent activities (Wang et al., 2010; Haß et al., 2015), 
with greater likelihood of securities action lawsuits (Shi et al., 2015), as well as greater risk-taking 
(e.g., Goel and Thakor, 2008; Kini and Williams, 2012) in order to increase the likelihood of 
winning the tournament (i.e., getting the promotion). However, such actions alter a firm’s risk 
profile, and eventually, can be detrimental to the firm if executives take excessive risks. This is 
evidenced by Bebchuk et al. (2011), who find that larger tournament prizes (i.e., higher pay gaps) 
are associated with poorer performance and Chen et al. (2013) who show that pay disparity is 
positively associated with the implied cost of equity.  
Collectively, the managerial power view of tournament incentives postulates that large 
executive pay disparities promote greater risk-taking at the expense of shareholders. This reasoning 
yields the following hypothesis: 
Managerial Pay Gap Hypothesis: The pay gap between the CEO and other senior 
executives is positively associated with IPO failure risk. 
 
3.  Sample Selection and Methodology 
Our sample selection starts with identifying all of the initial public offerings (IPOs) between 
2000 and 2012 in the Thomson ONE Banker database. Because our minimum survival window is 
five years, we track these IPO issuers until 31 December 2017 to determine whether or not they 
were ever delisted.
6
 Following the common filtering criteria in the IPO literature, we eliminate 
financial institutions, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, unit offers, and 
any other non-common stock type of shares. In addition, we eliminate any IPOs with offer price 
below $5. We obtain IPO background and issuance information from the Thomson ONE Banker, 
including the issue data, offer price, total proceeds raised, whether the firm is backed by venture 
capital and the details of the underwriters involved. For underwriter prestige ranking, the study 
employs Jay Ritter’s measures of underwriter quality. Accounting data are retrieved from the 
Compustat database, and public trading prices are from the Center for Research and Security Prices 
(CRSP). 
Data regarding the executive compensation (e.g. salary, bonus, restricted stock, options, 
non-equity incentive plans, and total compensation) of the CEOs of IPOs are carefully hand 
collected from firm prospectuses (S-1) on the EDGAR database of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Also, we use the IPO prospectuses to construct biographical profiles 
of CEOs (e.g., CEO duality, tenure) and the BoardEx database for information about their work 
                                                          
6
 For example, a firm that went public in 2000 is tracked for 17 years compared to only five years for a firm that went 
public in 2012 
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experience. After merging the data from these databases and eliminating observations with missing 
values, our final sample consists of 1,178 IPO firms.  
CRSP provides delisting codes to indicate the status of the issuing firm, specifically, 
whether the firm is still trading and specific reasons for delisting, such as failure to meet listing 
standards, corporate governance violation, liquidation, insufficient capital, bankruptcy, and so on. 
Based on the CRSP delisting codes, we divide the IPO firms into five groups based on their three-
digit CRSP delisting code: acquired (200-290), exchanged (300-390), liquidated (400-490), 
dropped (500-591) or survived. Following previous literature (Jain and Kini, 2000) survived firms 
are defined as firms that continue to operate independently as public corporations and appeared in 
the CRSP feed from the time of the IPO to at least five years later. Our sample of 1,178 IPOs is 
comprised of 814 survived firms, 274 acquired firms, 82 dropped firms, 6 exchanged firms and 2 
liquidated firms. 
 
4.  Survival Analysis Methodology 
4.1 Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
To assess our hypotheses, and specifically, whether the survival profile of our IPO firms is a 
function of executive compensation incentives, we apply both nonparametric and semi-parametric 
approaches. To this end, we initially employ the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model. The 
advantage of this model is that the baseline hazard function follows the firm over a specified time 
period and focuses on the point in time that it experiences an event of interest.
7
 We estimate the 
following model: 
 
 ( )    ( )                                                                       (1) 
 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, and t is the time to failure (i.e., the duration to the 
delisting date). The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that indicates the failure risk (i.e., 
whether the firm delists within five years after the IPO); thus, a negative (positive) coefficient 
indicates that an increase in managerial incentives leads to a decrease (increase) in the probability 
of delisting in the subsequent period. The hazard ratio for each independent variable is computed as 
the exponentiated coefficient for the variable; it measures the increase in failure risk for a unit 
increase in the value of the independent variable. If the hazard ratio is above one, then an increase 
                                                          
7 Additionally, it is particularly useful for censored data; for example, events (such as delisting of IPOs) that either have 
different time horizons or have yet to occur. In our study, the survival time of IPO firms is right-censored because 
many firms that went public are still trading. Also, the time window is different for each firm depending on its IPO 
date. Hence, its s primary advantage over ordinary least squares (OLS) and the binary dependent variable model is that 
it allows us to take into account the length of time that a company survives (Hensler et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 2000). 
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in the covariate increases the failure rate, while a hazard ratio of less than one indicates than an 
increase in the covariate decreases the failure rate.
8
  
The managerial pay incentives variables are total CEO compensation and firm pay gap. We 
define the total CEO compensation as the natural logarithm of the sum of salary, bonus, stock and 
option awards, non-equity incentives, and other long-term incentive pay-outs. We measure the 
strength of tournament-based incentives (i.e. pay disparity) as the natural logarithm of the 
difference between the CEO’s total compensation and the median total pay of the other senior 
executives (Kale et al., 2009).
9
 
 
4.2 Control Variables 
 We control for a variety of firm, CEO and IPO characteristics that are suggested by prior 
literature as being determinants of IPO survival. Nelson (2003) finds that a founder-CEO increases 
the IPO valuation. Further, Adams et al. (2005) argue that the influence of a CEO-chairperson 
increases the chances of survival. In line with these studies, Gounopoulos and Pham (2018) suggest 
that IPO firms with a CEO-chairperson (CEO duality), a CEO-founder and a CEO with long tenure 
survive longer after IPO. Thus, we include CEO duality, CEO tenure, CEO Ownership, and CEO-
founder variables to control for these characteristics.  
Also, to account for the positive effects on IPO survival of firm size and underpricing, as 
documented by Schultz (1993) and Hensler et al. (1997), we include firm size (total assets) and 
initial returns.
10
 Schultz (1993) finds a positive relationship between the use of reputable 
underwriters and IPO survival, while Jain and Kini (2000) indicate that the involvement of venture 
capitalists (VCs) in the IPO process also improves the survival profiles of IPO firms. Another 
strand of literature (e.g., Jain and Martin, 2005; Bhattacharya et al., 2015) suggests that IPO firms 
that are audited by high-quality accounting firms survive longer in the following years. 
Furthermore, Certo et al. (2001) support the view that the presence of venture capital seems to 
affect outcomes in IPO. To capture the impact of these financial intermediaries on IPO survival, we 
include the following indicator variables: underwriter, VC, and Big 4 Auditor. Additionally, based 
                                                          
8
 In our case, we use continuous variables, thus, the estimated change in the hazard rate for a unit increase in the 
independent variable is 100×(hazard ratio-1) ( Jain and Martin, 2005). 
9
 We use the top three executives including the CEO rather than the top four executives, which is common in the 
literature because the average number per year of non-CEO executives in our sample period is close to three per firm. 
However, our results are robust if we use whenever is possible, the top four executives for the median estimation. In 
addition, when the compensation gap is negative, we monotonically transform all observations by adding a constant 
equivalent to the absolute value of the minimum gap, although our results remain the same if we do not apply this 
transformation. 
10
 Alternatively, in our baseline specification we use the natural logarithm of sales or the natural logarithm of proceeds 
instead of the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size and our results remain unchanged. We are 
grateful to Tim Loughran for highlighting this aspect. 
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on the findings of Demers and Joos (2007), we add financial leverage to control for the influence of 
a firms’ borrowing capacity on the probability of failure.  
With respect to investment policies, Jain and Kini (2008) suggest that the probability of IPO 
survival is positively associated with research and development (R&D) expenditures, whereas 
Demers and Joos (2007) document that R&D expenses is expected to provide an indication of the 
firm’s riskiness. On the basis of these studies, we control for the impact of strategic investment on 
IPO survival by including the intensity of both R&D spend and capital expenditures. In addition, 
Gounopoulos and Pham (2018) find a positive association between survivorship and profitability, 
hence, we account for the effect of firm performance by including the earnings per share (EPS). We 
also consider measures of market conditions in the IPO market (market return) as well as industry 
conditions (industry concentration) and board governance quality. Lastly, to ensure that we 
adequately control for risk, we consider whether the IPO firm is in the Internet or technology sector 
and whether it is listed in Nasdaq. 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
This section reports the results of our analysis on IPO survival. Firstly, we present summary 
statistics, together with graphical evidence using the Nelson-Aalen and Kaplan-Meier methods to 
estimate the hazard and survival functions. Next, we focus on the duration analysis results using the 
Cox proportional hazard model. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 utilizes the trading status of our sample firms and categorizes them into five groups: 
dropped, acquired, exchanged, liquidated, and survived. Then, it presents distributional variability 
of these sub-samples by year and by industry. Panel A shows that in tracking for five years after the 
issue date, 69.10% of the firms survived, 23.26% were acquired, 6.96% failed, 0.51% were 
exchanged, and 0.17% were liquidated. Finally, we find that approximately 30% of IPOs either 
dropped or are acquired within five years after of their offering. 
Panel B of Table 1 repeats the same exercise by year. The number of IPOs tends to decline 
after economic crises, as indicated by the dot-com bubble of 2000 and the credit crunch of 2007. 
The percentage of firms being dropped is highest among those going public in 2000 (12.12%) and 
2008 (11.76%). This is consistent with the economic crises in those years, which had an adverse 
impact on IPO firms’ survival. The percentage of firms being acquired is highest in 2012 (34%) 
and lowest in 2008 (6%). Further, the proportion of exchanged and liquidated firms is less than 1% 
in most years, except for 2008 where it was approximately equal to 6%. In general, more than half 
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of the firms survive for at least five years after their IPO. The highest proportion of survived firms 
(76%) is found in 2005 while the lowest proportion (62%) of survived firms is in 2012.  
Panel C of Table 1 classifies IPO firms by sectors and reveals a relatively high 
concentration of IPOs in the computer equipment and services sector, as well as in the chemical 
products sector. The industry with the highest percentage of acquired IPOs is scientific 
instrumentations (26.67%), followed by electronic equipment (26.23%). Entertainment services 
(13.33%) and manufacturing (9.38%) are the industries with the highest percentage of dropped 
firms, while those with the lowest proportion are food products and wholesale and retail trade. It is 
worth noting that in all industries the percentage of survived firms does not fall below 57%. 
Particularly, the proportion of survived firms is highest in entertainment services (86.67%) and 
transportation and public utilities (78.57%), while the lowest percentages of survived firms are 
found in manufacturing (57.29%) and computer and equipment services (61.57%). 
Panel D of Table 1 demonstrates the cumulative survival rates (using the non-parametric 
Kaplan-Meier method) of our sample as well as those with highly and poorly compensated CEOs 
for one, three, and five years after IPO. The findings demonstrate a substantial degree of variation 
according to the year of issue with one-year survival rates ranging from 88.23% to 100%. In 
particular, survival rates drop from the maximum of 100% recorded in 2001 to 88% recorded in 
2008. It is also worth noting that cumulative survival rates over one, three and five years following 
IPO are higher for firms with highly remunerated CEOs in most of the years (except 2004, 2008, 
and 2010). 
Panel A of Table 2 compares the values of our compensation variables over the three 
samples (overall sample, firms with highly and firms with poorly compensated CEOs). Over the 
sample period, the mean total CEO remuneration is $1.297 million and the average gap between 
CEO remuneration and the median remuneration of other executive members is $0.9 million, which 
is considerably lower than that found in studies focusing on seasoned firms (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; 
Vo and Canil, 2016). The median compensation of other executives is around $0.5 million. In terms 
of the components of CEO compensation, salary accounts for the largest proportion (52%), 
followed by option awards (17%) and bonus (16%). The high pay packages of highly remunerated 
CEOs are largely the result of bonuses and option awards. 
Panel B of Table 2 describes the average CEO profile for the overall sample and for the 
high and low CEO compensation sub-samples. On average, a CEO is 50 years old with tenure of 
approximately four years. The 30% of CEOs are also founders of the firm and 54% hold a chair 
position (CEO duality). In addition, it seems that firms prefer to hire new CEOs with general skills. 
In line with the compensation literature, CEOs in the high compensation sub-sample tend to have 
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more experience or knowledge than their counterparts, as indicated by their higher age. 
Furthermore, consistent with the existing literature (Custodio et al., 2013), firms are willing to 
provide more generous remuneration packages to generalists as well as to CEOs who also act as 
board chairperson. By contrast, in the high compensation regime, the proportion of founder-CEOs 
is considerably lower than that of professional CEOs, which is consistent with the notion that 
founder-CEOs have intrinsic motivation, and, hence, lower dependence on external incentives. 
Panel C of Table 2 presents the firm and IPO characteristics for the overall sample and the 
sub-samples of firms with highly and poorly remunerated CEOs. On average, the IPO firms are 
relatively young (15 years) and around half of them are VC-backed. In addition, 40% of firms are 
in a high-tech industry and almost 10% are characterized as internet stocks. Around 35% of the 
IPOs are underwritten by top-tier investment banks and 83% are audited by the Big 4 accounting 
firms. Moreover, the average IPO first-day returns are 22.22%, while the vast majority of the firms 
(72%) are listed in Nasdaq.  
Panel C of Table 2 suggests a positive pay-performance link between accounting-based 
profitability (i.e. EPS) and remuneration, which is consistent with the well-documented finding that 
CEO pay reflects —at least partially— a reward for prior or contemporaneous performance (Coles 
et al., 2006). It also confirms the idea, that larger and older firms provide more generous 
remuneration packages than small ones (e.g., Gabaix and Landier, 2008). It is also worth 
mentioning that such firms are able to attract more reputable investment banks (i.e. underwriters), 
but have less backing by VCs. With regard to the initial returns, it seems that the market perceives 
highly compensated CEOs as better skilled and more capable than poorly compensated ones, 
because the former are associated with lower underpricing.  
 
5.2 Estimation of the Cox Proportional Hazards Model on Total CEO Compensation 
Panel A of Table 3 assesses the impact of total CEO compensation on the probability of IPO 
survival using the Cox proportional hazards model after controlling for various firm and CEO 
attributes that may influence the long-term IPO prospects. Specification (1) documents a strong and 
significant negative coefficient for total CEO compensation, suggesting that IPO firms with better 
remunerated CEOs have a lower probability of failure. This finding supports the first efficient 
contracting hypothesis that IPO firms with a highly compensated CEO have better chances of 
survival than those with a poorly compensated CEO. The economic effect is meaningful: the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimate suggests that firms with CEO pay in the 75
th
 percentile have a 
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failure risk that is, on average, 21.81% lower than that of firms with CEO pay in the 
25
th
 percentile.
11
 
In Specifications (2) and (3) we examine the possibility that the coefficient of the total CEO 
compensation masks information embedded in the individual remuneration components. As 
expected, the decomposition of total compensation into its cash and equity components reveals that 
the link between compensation and IPO mortality is driven by the long-term element of pay.  
As for the results for the remaining control variables, their sign and significance is generally 
consistent with prior literature in all specifications. In particular, we find that firms with CEOs who 
also serve as chairperson tend to have a lower probability of failure (Adams et al., 2005). We also 
find that firms with long-tenured have a lower probability of failure. Additionally, firms with 
higher IPO first-day returns tend to have a higher risk of delisting in subsequent periods. In contrast 
to the findings of Jain and Kini (2000), our results suggest than VC-backing is not significantly 
associated with IPO mortality.  
Moreover, we do not find a significant relationship between IPO survival and profitability. 
Surprisingly, the results involving firm size and its impact on IPO survival contradict the existing 
literature (e.g., Espenlaub et al., 2012), because of the positive association with failure risk. With 
respect to underwriter prestige and Big 4 auditors, our results suggest that maily the top-
underwriters are important. Also, we find that well-governed firms as well as firms operating in a 
low competition environment have lower risks of failure in periods following the offering. With 
respect to the investment variables, CAPEX increases the survival rates, whereas R&D intensity 
increases the failure rates (Demers and Joos, 2007), however, only the latter appears significant.  
 
5.3 Estimation of the Cox Proportional Hazards Model on Total Pay Disparity 
Next, we continue our analysis by replacing the total CEO compensation with the firm pay 
gap. Specification (1) of Panel B (Table 3) indicates that, the coefficient for total firm pay gap is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. In economic terms, the magnitude of the coefficient 
estimate suggests that firms with pay gaps in the 75
th
 percentile have a failure risk that is, on 
average, 20.55% lower than that of firms with pay gaps in the 25
th
 percentile.
12
 Specifications (2) 
and (3) of Panel B provide further insights by examining the impact of short-term and long-term 
firm pay disparities on IPO survival. The estimated coefficients for short-term and long-term pay 
                                                          
11
 This estimate represents the change in the hazard rate for a firm that moves from the 25
th
  to the 75
th
 percentile of the 
distribution of the natural logarithm of total CEO compensation (13.99-12.76) and is calculated as follows: exp(-0.20 x 
1.23) -1 = -21.81%. 
12
 The change in the hazard rate for a firm that moves in the interquartile range of the distribution of the natural 
logarithm of pay gap (13.55-11.78) is calculated as follows: exp(-0.13x 1.77) -1 = -20.55%. 
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gap produce different results. In particular, the coefficient for a short-term pay gap is positive and 
insignificant, while the coefficient for a long-term pay gap is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. This suggests that, as in the case of total CEO compensation, IPO firms with large executive 
pay disparities face a lower probability of failure than those with small pay disparities, and this 
relationship is largely driven by the long-term component of pay disparities. With respect to the 
coefficients and the significance of the remaining covariates, the results are comparable to those of 
the preceding sub-section across all specifications.  
Collectively, the evidence in this section corroborates the efficient contracting hypothesis of 
executive compensation, and particularly the tournament view of pay disparities, given that firms 
with high pay disparities among top executives are more likely to survive following IPO than firms 
with small pay disparities.
13
 Our results remain robust once we account for the time to failure using 
the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) method. 
 
6.  Robustness Analysis 
6.1 CEO Turnover in the Post-IPO Period 
Since our study focuses on evaluating the effect of pre-IPO executive pay on firm survival, 
an important methodological issue to consider is the treatment of sample firms where CEO turnover 
occurs during the five year post-IPO window over which IPO survival is being evaluated. For 
example, assessing the effect of executive compensation on firm survival over a five-year post-IPO 
window, whereas CEO departure occurs earlier (i.e., within the first or second year of going public, 
can overstate or understate estimates of the compensation incentives effect on firm survivorship.   
To examine the incidence of CEO replacement, we examine the rate of CEO turnover that 
occurs within five years of the IPO. As shown in Panel A of Table 4, a total 605 (out of 1,178 
CEOs) instances of CEO departure occurs within five years of going public. The highest incidence 
of CEO departure takes place in the second and the third year following the IPO, while the lowest 
is found one year after the IPO.
14
 Hence, it seems that the CEO’s tenure after the IPO does not 
always coincide with the period over which survival is assessed. Therefore, it may be the case that 
the documented CEO incentive effect is contaminated by other factors that are not directly related 
to the CEOs under consideration.  
                                                          
13 In additional robustness checks we repeated all of our baseline regressions after clustering the standard errors by 
either industry or year. We find that both of these options increase the statistical significance of our variables of 
interest. 
14
 Our sample yearly average CEO turnover rate is approximately 11%, which is close the CEO turnover rate of public 
firms (9.63%) reported in Gao et al. (2017). 
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To address this issue, we follow Gao and Jain (2011) and consider a new tracking window 
by following each IPO firm from the IPO date until the earlier of its delisting date, CEO departure 
date, or the fifth anniversary after the listing to ensure that the pay-survivorship link is assessed 
over a post-IPO period where the CEO remains into the firm. Within this new tracking period (i.e., 
the minimum of the difference between the IPO date and CEO departure date, the IPO date and 
delisting date, and the fifth anniversary), we investigate whether and when the firm is delisted. The 
results in Panel B of Table 4 reveal that under this specification the effect of executive pay on IPO 
survival is in fact stronger than the effect reported in the baseline tests. 
Finally, as a robustness check, we re-examine the impact of managerial incentives by 
excluding all firms where CEO turnover occurs prior to the five-year IPO anniversary. Panel C of 
Table 4 reports the results. The columns display the results for different CEO turnover rates and 
demonstrate that both of our managerial incentives measures continue to be negatively associated 
with firm failure throughout all the post-IPO period. Overall, these findings suggest that the 
incidence of CEO turnover during the Post-IPO period does not exert a meaningful effect on our 
main inferences. 
 
6.2 Alternative Measurements 
In this subsection, we investigate whether our results are robust to alternative definitions of 
IPO failure and pay gap. When examining whether there exists a systematic relationship between 
managerial pay and firm survival we classified all merger and acquisitions (M&A) as genuine 
delistings. Because not all M&A delisting are necessary bad news, we reclassify delistings due to 
acquisition as “censored survivors” based on a set of performance indicators before the IPO year or 
the acquisition year. Alternatively, we treat all M&A delisting as survivors. We also evaluate 
whether our results are sensitive to limiting the window of failure to three years after the IPO. Our 
results remain unchanged regardless of the definition of IPO failure. 
Another potential concern is whether our measure of pay gap is affected by an uneven 
distribution of pay among the senior executives. Because, it is based on the median executive pay, 
it is possible that it could overestimate (underestimate) the strength of tournament-based incentives. 
In addition, it could be highly correlated with firm size, a major determinant of CEO compensation. 
To alleviate these concerns, we recalculate the pay gap using the mean compensation instead of the 
median of the senior executives. Then, we replace it with the CEO pay slice, calculated as the 
fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top three executives paid to the CEO. None of these 
tests alter our main inferences. The Internet Appendix describes in detail these robustness tests. 
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6.3 Alternative Explanations and Identification Concerns 
Our results, so far, establish a robust positive relationship between managerial pay and firm 
survival. It is possible, however, that endogeneity concerns plague our empirical analysis. In 
particular, our model may be suffered from bias due to: i) time-invariant (fixed) omitted CEO 
and/or firm variables that affect both the failure rates and the compensation policies of IPO firms in 
a similar manner, ii) time-varying omitted variables that affect our independent variables (absolute 
and relative CEO pay) as well as the dependent variable (firm survival), and iii) endogenous CEO-
firm matching (i.e., non-random assignment of managers to the firm) due to observable 
distributional differences of firm and CEO characteristics between firms with and without high 
managerial pay. In what follows, we provide some piece of evidence inconsistent with a pure 
endogeneity explanation of our results, suggesting that, at least part of the managerial pay-survival 
relationship is causal. 
 
6.3.1 Fixed Omitted Firm and CEO Heterogeneity 
We initially explore the possibility that instead of managerial incentives driving firm 
performance, omitted firm-level characteristics that can be associated with the pay-setting process 
and IPO survival are driving the results. For example, it is possible that only firms with favorable 
growth prospects or abundant resources are able to provide generous compensation packages in 
order to attract talented managers and better motivate them. Alternatively, it might be the case that 
firms with a need for a certain management style might opt for a CEO who has this style and 
provide a higher remuneration in order to attract and retain this CEO.  
This suggests that better controls for firm quality should dissipate the managerial pay 
effects. One way to address this issue is by including firm-fixed effects in order to capture all 
observed and unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics that may be correlated with IPO 
failure. However, in our context, this is infeasible, since we observe every firm only once. Instead, 
a close substitute is the inclusion of additional firm characteristics that can be assumed to remain 
reasonably stable during the IPO-process and the immediate aftermarket period. Towards this end, 
we consider the quality of the compensation committee as an additional control (Compensation 
Committee Quality), given that it is the most relevant governance mechanism in the design of 
compensation-based incentives. In addition, we incorporate in our baseline model the degree of 
diversification (Diversified Firms) of the firms’ operations, since this might reduce the exposure to 
exogenous adverse shocks. 
 Next, we turn our attention to omitted CEO-level characteristics. Omission of time-invariant 
CEO attributes that are correlated with managerial pay and the long-term viability of IPO issuers 
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might introduce bias. For example, CEOs with better pay may be more conservative in project 
selection due to reputation concerns in the labor market. If this is true, managerial pay does not 
reflect superior skills or incentives that lead to extra effort, rather it merely captures managerial 
preferences correlated with compensation. These explanations suggest that the inclusion of CEO 
fixed effects should make the managerial pay effects disappear. However, given that a private firm 
can go public only once, there is no within CEO-firm variation in our sample. As before, we can 
assume that at the time surrounding the IPO, some observable characteristics might be considered 
as time-invariant, and hence partially absorb fixed CEO heterogeneity. For this purpose, we add to 
our baseline Cox model an array of variables associated with CEO risk aversion, experience, 
power, talent, and education: CEO gender (Faccio et al., 2016); CEO age (Serfling, 2014); CEO 
power (Adams et al., 2005); CEO academic attainments (MBA, PhD, JD or MD); and CEO general 
managerial skills (Custodio et al., 2013). 
In Column (1) of Table 5 we repeat the baseline regression after including the additional 
firm and CEO characteristics. The results indicate that these controls do not meaningfully affect the 
managerial pay effect, thus alleviating to some extent the concern that omitted firm and/or CEO 
characteristics are driving our results. 
 
6.3.2 Time-varying Omitted Variables 
We next consider the scenario in which an unobserved variable that is not necessarily fixed, 
affects our independent variables (absolute and relative CEO compensation) as well as the 
dependent variable (firm survival). For instance, we may assume that even if the true CEO ability is 
constant over time, the shareholders’ perception of this ability or boards’ pay-setting practices, both 
of which shape compensation design, may not be constant, as they continuously update their priors 
on CEO ability. To capture the possibility of time-varying omitted variables, and hence mitigate 
reverse causality concerns, we employ an instrumental variable approach. 
Following Kini and Williams (2012), we employ Log (Median Total CEO Pay) and Log 
(Median Total Pay Gap) as instruments for CEO compensation and tournament incentives, 
respectively. Since tournament incentives are a function of managerial compensation, median 
values of pay gap for firms that are in the same industry are also natural choices for instrumenting 
tournament incentives.
15
 Regarding the justification of these instruments, Murphy (1999) and Kale 
et al. (2009) suggest that industry norms is an important determinant of the level and structure of 
managerial compensation.
 
This suggests that that industry-wide pay practices may set the standard 
                                                          
15 These instrumental variables are defined as the natural logarithms of the median values of the incentive measures for 
IPO firms in the same two-digit industry and in the same year as the firm after excluding the firms in question. 
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for designing compensation packages of any given firm in the industry, suggesting that Log 
(Median Total CEO Compensation) and Log (Median Total Firm Gap) are valid instruments. At the 
same time, it is unlikely that industry-level practices can be affected by individual firms, nor that 
the former have a direct impact on firm risk policies, at least after adjusting for industry and year 
fixed effects. Hence, that they are more likely to be orthogonal to the residuals in the second stage 
regression.
16
 
 Following Bhattacharya et al. (2015), we perform a two-stage instrumental probit (IV) 
regression. In the first step of our IV regression analysis, we compute the predicted values of CEO 
compensation and total pay gap by including a standard set of compensation determinants. Results 
from the first stage regression are presented in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. An inspection of 
Column (1) reveals that both CEO pay and CEO pay gap are positively and significantly affected 
by their respective instruments, consistent with the intuition provided above.
17
 
The first stage also allows us to have an F-test for the relevance of the instruments. The rule 
of thumb establishes that instruments are not weak if the first-stage F statistic (  : coefficients of 
all instruments = 0) is greater than zero. In our case, the first stage F-statistics are equal to 65.29 (p-
value=0.000) and 43.02 (p-value=0.000), which implies that our instruments are relevant and not 
weak. At the bottom of the table is a Wald test of the exogeneity of the instrumented variables. The 
tests technically fail to reject the null hypothesis that managerial incentives measures are 
exogenous (p-value=0.1214, and p-value=0.1312).  
 Results from the second stage regression are presented in Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B 
(Table 6). The results illustrate that, once instrumented for Log (Median Total CEO Compensation) 
and Log (Median Total Firm Gap), the managerial pay measures significantly affect the probability 
of being delisted. Thus, we confirm that after taking into account unobserved factors that may 
affect selection, firms with higher absolute and relative pay are still associated with fewer 
incidences of post-IPO death.
18
  
                                                          
16 However, we acknowledge that instruments based on industry aggregates will not be truly exogenous if other firms 
in the same industry have unobserved heterogeneities that are correlated with the unobserved heterogeneities of the 
focal firm. To mitigate this concern, we also calculate the managerial pay instruments based on the Execucomp 
S&P500 firms, assuming that the industry median of these firms provides better exogenous variation than the IPO 
firms. Our conclusions are not sensitive to this choice. 
17 It is worth noting that CEO pay is positively correlated with proxies for the firms’ demand for a high quality CEO 
(such as firm size, diversification, and managerial ability), while there is no significant association with standard 
determinants of governance quality (CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, and Board Governance). Interestingly, founders are 
negatively related with managerial pay. These suggest that it is mostly equilibrium forces that explain variation in IPO 
pay setting practices. 
18 We also address the issue of endogeneity by performing bivariate probit estimation (for a detailed analysis, please 
refer to the Internet Appendix). 
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6.3.3 Endogenous Hiring and CEO Tenure 
The instrumental variables estimator does not fully solve the endogenous firm-CEO match 
concern, as it explores exogenous variation in different pay-setting practices within industries and 
not in the decision to provide high-powered incentives.  
Another way to examine whether our findings are solely driven by a causal effect of 
managerial pay on survival or solely by matching is to restrict our sample to a subset for which 
matching is likely to be less important (Custodio et al., 2013). If firms hire CEOs to better suit their 
objectives or in anticipation of an important event (such as the transition from private to public) the 
matching effect between the CEO and firms is likely to be strongest when the CEO is first 
appointed (Hirshleifer et al., 2012). Therefore, under the selection view, one would expect the 
matching effect of managerial pay to be more pronounced closest to hire, i.e., to be more valuable 
for recently hired CEOs. If this is so, we would anticipate higher survival rates to be driven mainly 
by recently appointed CEOs.  
We reexamine the effect of managerial pay after eliminating all observations in which the 
manager is new and vary the minimum tenure cutoff from 1 to 4 years. Table 7 summarizes the 
coefficients. For ease of comparison, the first column repeats the baseline results from Table 3 in 
which all observations are included, whereas the remaining columns show the results for different 
tenure cutoffs. The CEO compensation coefficient continues to be negatively related to IPO failure 
and becomes stronger as the tenure increases. This is clear evidence that board selection is not 
driving the effect of pay on IPO survival: the effect of pay is much stronger in years after which the 
proposed effect should have been evident. 
Using a similar reasoning, one could argue that, to the extent that CEO pay gap reflects the 
CEO’s relative ability and contribution, the positive impact of pay gap on firm survival will be 
concentrated to newly hired CEOs, if optimal matching is the main driver of our results. Instead, if 
selection does not dominate the relative CEO incremental contribution effect, we would anticipate a 
stronger pay influence on firm survival as the CEO tenure increases. Table 7 summarizes the pay 
gap coefficients after eliminating all observations in which the manager is new and vary the 
minimum tenure cutoff from 1 to 4 years. The results reveal that the point estimate of CEO gap 
increases with CEO tenure. In the Internet Appendix, we further explore the selection bias problem 
by using the Two-Stage Heckman approach. This method indicates that the treatment effect of 
managerial pay on firm survival exists even after we control for selection. 
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6.3.4 Potential Endogenous Bias due to Observable Confounding Variables 
 CEOs and companies are not matched randomly. Rather the selection of a CEO is decision 
taken solely by the board of directors. The existence of an assortative matching mechanism 
between CEOs and firms could be justified, for example, if firms that follow conservative policies 
choose to hire managers who also possess conservative managerial styles or the desirable skill set 
to implement these policies. It could also be the case that CEOs having an idiosyncratic preference 
for specific types of firms or particular corporate policies to be matched with firms that present a 
good fit. As Panel C of Table 2 shows, better compensated CEOs tend to run mature firms with 
conservative investment policies. Hence, our results might be driven by the above tendencies. 
 One way to determine whether our conclusions are a statistical artifact stemming from 
distributional differences in CEO and firm characteristics between firms with high versus low 
managerial pay, is to employ a matching estimator. This technique involves the creation of pairs 
that are comparable for all covariates but differ only in their absolute and relative pay. As a 
consequence, it ensures that the variation in IPO survival can be attributed to the variation in the 
test variable (managerial pay) with greater confidence. 
 In implementing this method, we run a condition probit regression to estimate propensity 
scores, i.e., the probability of receiving the treatment (i.e., high managerial pay) conditional on a set 
of carefully selected variables. For each treatment firm with high managerial pay, we select a 
matching control firm with a low managerial pay from the same year, with the requirement that the 
absolute difference of the propensity score among pairs does not excess 0.01. We employ this 
method without repetition and estimate the propensity score for each firm, after considering a set of 
controls that essentially capture all the CEO and firm characteristics used in the baseline regression. 
We also include industry membership, since some industries are more likely to feature managers 
with higher managerial pay. 
 This method yields 646 unique pairs of firms, which is approximately 55% of the initial 
sample.
19
 Panel A of Table 8 reports difference-in-difference means of the control variables for 
firms with high versus low managerial pay for both matched samples. As expected, the 
corresponding difference-in-difference means become statistically insignificant for the matched 
sample, confirming that the propensity score matching succeeds in making the sample of firms with 
high managerial pay comparable to the sample with lower managerial pay. Based on the matched 
set of treatment and control firms, we re-run the Cox model of Table 3. The results on Panel B of 
Table 8 confirm the significantly negative association between our managerial pay measures and 
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 Following the same procedure for the total pay gap, this method yields 724 unique pairs of firms. 
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the incidence of failure. Overall, the propensity score results continue to support a robust positive 
relationship between managerial pay and IPO survival, reinforcing the baseline inferences that 
there is a systematic difference of the managerial pay effect on IPO survival rates.
20
  
 
7.  Cross Sectional Variation in Compensation and Tournament Incentives 
In this section, we explore cross-sectional variations in the importance of CEO 
compensation and pay disparities on IPO survival along the different CEO characteristics and 
dimensions of corporate governance. An important benefit of this analysis is that it can present a 
more nuanced picture of the effect of these managerial incentives by highlighting settings in which 
their effectiveness is either pronounced or weakened. 
 
7.1 CEO Characteristics 
Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Frydman (2007) report a secular increase in CEO pay 
over recent decades and attribute it (to some extent) to the increasing demand for CEOs with 
general managerial skills, while Gounopoulos and Pham (2018) confirm the existence of a similar 
trend in the IPO market. Despite the prevalence for hiring generalist CEOs often being cited as 
evidence for the efficient contracting approach, this practice may also have some undesirable 
consequences for organizational outcomes. Whereas specialist managerial skills are focused on 
particular firms and industries, general managerial skills are readily transferable across firms and 
industries (Crossland et al., 2014). This translates into higher mobility in the CEO job-market, 
suggesting that the wealth of generalists is less contingent on the performance of the firm they 
manage.  
Additionally, given the tendencies of CEOs with varied career experiences to deviate from 
pre-determined firm strategies (Hambrick et al., 1993), to be more open to experiences 
(Zimmerman, 2008), and show a preference for experimentation and change (Crossland et al., 
2014), generalist CEOs may be more inclined to undertake risky strategies without much concern 
about the effect of such choices on a firm’s prospects. Based on this reasoning, Mishra (2014) 
argues that the risk profile of a generalist CEO may be misaligned with the interests of 
shareholders, thus exacerbating agency problems for the firm. As a result, we anticipate that the 
negative relationship between CEO pay and IPO failure is weakened (strengthened) for firms with 
generalist (specialist) CEOs.  
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 In untabulated results, we reach to similar conclusions when the dependent variable is survival time instead of failure 
risk. 
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Another managerial trait commonly used in the literature is CEO age. This variable captures 
the interplay between career concerns and real investment decisions. Li et al. (2017) point out that 
career concerns are of particular importance because managers are expected to deliberately adjust 
their investment behavior in order to favorably influence the labor market perceptions of their 
abilities, reputation and future prospects. The impact of career concerns is stronger for managers 
that are further away from retirement or relatively new to a position, as these agents are more likely 
to capitalize the market’s beliefs about their abilities (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). As a 
consequence, the effort exerted by younger CEOs is generally higher than that of older CEOs, 
which implies a greater effectiveness of compensation schemes for such CEOs. 
The last aspect we consider here is founder CEOs. Compared to professional CEOs, founder 
CEOs are more likely to exhibit entrenchment behaviors, thereby negatively influencing post-IPO 
economic outcomes. However, research also highlights certain positive aspects of founder-CEO 
leadership that would imply lower agency costs. In fact, some researchers underscore the potential 
of lower agency costs in founder-led firms because of stronger psychological attachment and 
identification within the organization, greater firm specific skills, and longer investment horizons 
relative to non-founder CEOs (e.g., Certo et al., 2001; Nelson, 2003). As a result, the potential for 
lower agency costs in founder-CEO-led firms is likely to be particularly beneficial in setting 
incentive arrangements, since it can provide greater flexibility to management in designing 
compensation contracts. 
 In Panel A (Table 9), we examine in which subsamples of the aforementioned variables the 
link between CEO pay and IPO failure is strengthened or weakened. Our findings suggest a 
significant and negative association between total CEO compensation and IPO failure risk that is 
concentrated among firms with CEOs who are specialists, young, and non-founders.  
 
 7.2 Governance and Monitoring Mechanisms  
Chahine and Goergen (2011) argue that the role of incentivizing tools, such as 
compensation rewards, is better understood if it is studied in the context of a firm’s overall 
corporate governance. From this perspective, the central question is whether the traditional agency 
conflicts that tend to plague the link between CEO pay and firm performance are mitigated by the 
strength of corporate governance mechanisms. 
We address this question by examining how the role of compensation awards varies with 
board independence. Previous empirical studies show that independent boards may help mitigate 
the agency problems caused by the divergent objectives of senior management and shareholders 
(Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). Extending this reasoning to the IPO setting suggest that IPO firms with 
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more independent boards are more likely to ensure the effectiveness of CEO awards as a 
motivating factor, and as a consequence, improve the survival chances of the firm. 
In addition to board independence, we consider the quality of the remuneration committee 
because of its crucial role in the pay-setting process. Daily et al. (1998) note that the remuneration 
committee should not be regarded simply as a complementary disciplinary mechanism that just 
performs a monitoring role on the growth of executive pay. Rather, it should be viewed as an 
organizational device that sets the appropriate reward structure for board members. As a result, 
compensation packages become more effective incentive devices in the presence of strong, as 
opposed to weak, remuneration committees. 
Agency theory posits that the balance of power is also determined by the roles undertaken 
by the CEO. For instance, a common belief is that combining the CEO and chairperson roles leads 
to managerial power that may be excessive when compared to the efficient levels suggested by 
optimal contracts (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Similar arguments can be made with other proxies of 
managerial power such as triality (i.e., when the CEO is also chairperson and president), CEO 
tenure and CEO ownership. To capture the common influence of such factors we take the first 
principal component, which we refer to as CEO power. Accordingly, we anticipate that if managers 
exercise their excessive power to act in their personal interest at the expense of shareholders, the 
pay-performance link will be weakened, and as such, the beneficial role of CEO pay on IPO 
survival will be weakened in firms with over-powerful CEOs.  
In Panel B (Table 9), we examine in which subsamples of the above variables the link 
between CEO pay and IPO failure is strengthened or weakened. Our findings suggest a significant 
and negative association between total CEO compensation and IPO failure risk that is concentrated 
among firms with stronger governance structures.  
 
7.3 Promotion Incentives – Tournament-Based Promotion Incentives 
Kale et al. (2009) argue that, holding constant the magnitude of the tournament prize, the 
effectiveness of a pay gap as a motivator is strengthened when the probability of promotion to the 
CEO position is relatively high. Motivated by this hypothesis, we attempt to obtain a clearer 
understanding of the association between pay disparities and IPO survival, by assessing this 
association in various settings that might affect the probability of promotion. 
Yan and Rajagopalan (2004) argue that founder-CEOs possess high firm-specific capital 
and are more psychologically committed to the long-term viability of a firm than professional 
CEOs. Because their long-term interests are closely tied to their firm’s future prospects, we 
anticipate that they are less likely to leave a firm they established. Hence, the probability of 
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promotion for lower-ranked executives should be lower in founder-led CEO firms, which in turn, 
implies a less negative relationship between CEO pay gap and firm delisting.  
By contrast, CEOs that possess general managerial skills are more likely to take advantage 
of a promising job market and undertake job-hopping, since their skills are easily transferable 
across firms and industries (Giannetti, 2011). They also more easily recruited, as they are 
increasingly sought after in the executive labor market (Custodio et al., 2013). As such, we expect 
that the probability of promotion is higher in firms with generalist CEOs, and accordingly, the 
negative impact of pay disparity on failure rates will be pronounced in firms run by generalists. 
Lastly, prior literature suggests that when a CEO is old, and specifically close to retirement, the 
likelihood of promotion for other top management members should increase. Thus, our 
expectations are that the negative association between firm pay gap and IPO failure is strengthened 
in firms with CEOs who are relatively old.  
In Panel C (Table 9), we break the sample on the median of each of the aforementioned 
variables and examine in which subsamples the link between pay gap and IPO failure is 
strengthened or weakened. Consistent with our expectations, firms with high pay disparities tend to 
have lower failure rates if they also have CEOs who are non-founders, generalists, and close to 
retirement. 
 
8. The Effect of Managerial Incentives on Post-IPO Outcomes  
Our results thus far unequivocally support the positive impact of compensation 
arrangements on post-IPO survival. The probability of survival is a sophisticated measure for IPOs, 
because it captures the aggregate impact of a wide set of corporate decisions (Chadwick et al., 
2016). Most importantly, it acknowledges the possibility that newly listed companies may have a 
different objective function that seasoned firms, as their growth potential suggests that they are 
more likely to be concerned with attracting capital to finance their projects than reporting a positive 
trajectory of profits (Klepper, 2002). Nonetheless, an issue that remains unresolved is how 
specifically compensation arrangements allow IPO issuers to remain longer in the financial market. 
Do they enable firms to attract managers with high quality human capital? Do they also succeed in 
motivating these managers to exert greater effort in line with shareholder’s interests?  
We hypothesize that, if compensation arrangements around IPOs are indeed optimally 
designed, they will affect post-IPO outcomes through two channels: a certification and an ability 
channel. If higher CEO compensation reflects more reputable and higher quality management as 
well as effective incentive structures, it may play a certification role in the equity market, enabling 
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firms to convey the intrinsic value of the firm credibly to outsiders, reducing thus, the degree of 
information asymmetry about their underlying quality.  
At the same time, higher CEO compensation along with larger pay gaps should encourage 
the top management team to expend greater effort in order to maintain or improve the firm’s 
competitiveness. In this case, either due to greater ability and reputation at stake or because of more 
effective incentives, firms with higher absolute and relative CEO pay are expected to select better 
projects and implement them more ably. This reasoning implies that these firms should exhibit 
superior post-IPO operating performance. 
In the following subsections, we attempt to shed more light in these questions by exploring 
whether there is a systematic link between executive compensation packages with post-IPO 
uncertainty and future performance.  
 
8.1 The Signaling Role of IPO Compensation Arrangement on Post-IPO Uncertainty 
If compensation arrangements of IPO issuers are not primarily driven by entrenched CEOs, 
then they may play a symbolic role in financial markets, given that they can used by market 
participants as indicators of reputation, human capital, and overall quality of corporate governance. 
Under this scenario, absolute and relative CEO pay will be able to certify firm value and hence 
enable investors to discriminate which firms should have better access to the financial markets. We 
evaluate this certification role by studying whether our managerial compensation incentives 
measures are associated with post-IPO uncertainty as captured by the aftermarket idiosyncratic 
stock return volatility.  
In Panel A of Table 10 we report the mean of post-IPO idiosyncratic volatility for the 
managerial incentives subsamples using as a cutoff the median of total CEO compensation and 
CEO pay gap, respectively. The univariate results indicate that over the 36 month period following 
the IPO, the risk differentials across the subsamples become larger and are consistently statistically 
significant. In Panel B and C we examine whether the compensation measures affect stock 
volatility in a multivariate setting. The regression results indicate that the negative association 
between pay measures and post-IPO volatility is significant only within six months of the IPO. 
Overall, the above results confirm the contention that management teams with higher absolute and 
relative CEO pay reduce the extent of information asymmetry in the financial markets.  
 
8.2 The Effect of Managerial Incentives on Post-IPO Operating Performance  
As explained above, under optimal contracting, compensation arrangements should reflect 
the reputation and quality of human capital as well as the quality of incentive structures. In this 
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regard, either due to superior ability or reputation concerns firms with better compensated CEOs or 
larger pay gaps are expected to select better projects (characterized by a larger NPV for any given 
scale) and implement them more effectively. We explore this hypothesis by focusing on the 
association between absolute/relative CEO pay, market value, and operating performance (ROA). 
In Panel A (and B) of Table 11, we use the average value of Tobin’s Q over the next three 
years after the IPO as an indicator of value creation and find that it is positively related with both 
measures of managerial pay. To capture operating performance, we focus on the average level and 
changes in operating performance over the same period. The results suggest that higher values of 
our managerial pay measures are correlated with superior performance, and most importantly with 
greater improvements in performance.
21
 
 
9.  Conclusion 
The design of executive compensation arrangements is by far one of the most contentious 
corporate decisions. In this study, we attempt to shed more light on this debate by focusing on the 
IPO setting. We document that IPO firms with highly compensated CEOs and large pay disparities 
are more likely to survive in the aftermarket. We also find that the relationship between CEO pay 
and IPO survival is strengthened in environments with lower agency conflicts, whereas the link 
between pay gap and IPO survival is pronounced among firms with stronger internal promotion 
incentives. Further, we document that greater managerial pay is associated with lower information 
asymmetry, better valuation, and superior operating performance in the post-IPO market. 
Our evidence indicates that, on average, pay disparities in the boardroom signal the 
provision of incentives that might not otherwise be easily set. Investors and corporate boards of 
newly public firms would thus do well to pay close attention not only to compensation captured by 
the firms’ top executives, but also to how this compensation is divided among them. Our findings 
are also of relevance government to regulators, policy makers, and other stakeholders interested in 
the role of pay distribution in stimulating growth and innovation. Overall, our study focuses on a 
setting that is substantially different from that of mature corporations. By doing so, it provides a 
fresh perspective in the literature and informs the debate about the controversial role of corporate 
executive pay.   
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 In the Internet Appendix, we delve more deeply and investigate the existence of particular investment styles among 
management teams with generous CEO pay and large pay gaps. To do so, we ask whether higher managerial pay 
encourages manager to undertake long-term innovative projects or to make conservative corporate decisions that 
decrease the exposure to risky projects, and hence minimize the risk of delisting for poor performance. Our results 
provide some support for the first conjecture. 
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Appendix A: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: IPO Pricing 
Initial Returns 
The difference between the first secondary market closing price available in CRSP and IPO offer price, divided by 
IPO offer price. 
Panel B: Compensation Variables 
CEO Salary The logarithmic value of cash awarded to the CEO as cash compensation in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO Bonus The logarithmic value of cash awarded to the CEO as bonus in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO Stock Awards The logarithmic value of stock granted to the CEO evaluated at grant date using own firms’ estimates. 
CEO Option 
Awards 
The logarithmic value of options granted to the CEO as option awards under the year (prior to the IPO) plan in 
connection with the CEOs’ appointment. 
CEO Non-Equity 
Incentive Plan 
Compensation 
The logarithmic value of the actual amount earned under short-term, performance-based cash incentive plan for 
fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
CEO All Other 
Compensation 
The logarithmic value of all other compensation awarded to the CEO in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Total CEO Pay 
The logarithmic value of the sum of all the above compensation elements awarded to the CEO in the fiscal year 
prior to the IPO. 
Highly 
Compensated CEOs 
Dummy variable set to 1 if the total CEO pay is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Poorly 
Compensated CEOs 
Dummy variable set to 1 if the total CEO pay is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Total Pay Gap 
The natural logarithm of the difference between the compensation of CEO and the median compensation of the 
other senior executives (Kale et al., 2009). 
Large Pay 
Disparities 
Dummy variable set to 1 if the total pay gap is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Small Pay 
Disparities 
Dummy variable set to 1 if the total pay gap is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Slice The fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top 3 executives paid to the CEO (Bebchuk et al., 2011). 
Panel C: Governance Characteristics 
CEO Duality Dummy variable set to 1 if the CEO is both Chairperson and CEO, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Triality Dummy variable set to 1 if the CEO is Chairperson, President, and CEO, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Ownership Percentage of shares owned by the CEO in the issue year. 
General Ability 
Index 
First factor of applying principal components analysis to five proxies of general managerial ability: Number of roles, 
Number of firms, Number of industries, CEO experience dummy, Conglomerate experience dummy (following 
Custodio et al., 2013). 
Generalist 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is a generalist, and 0 otherwise. CEO is classified as a generalist if CEO’s 
general ability index is equal to or above the sample median. 
Founder Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is both founder and CEO, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Power 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO Powerful Factor score is above the sample median. CEO Powerful Factor 
score is obtained from Principle Component Analysis (PCA) using CEO tenure, CEO ownership, CEO Duality and 
CEO Triality (CEO, Chairperson and President).   
CEO Age 
Age of CEO (in years). Old CEOs are those who have age over the sample median (51) and young CEOs are those 
who have age lower than the sample median. 
CEO Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Tenure 
Number of years working as CEO in the firm until the IPO. CEOs with High Tenure are defined those with tenure 
above the sample median. 
CEO Turnover Dummy variable equal to 1 if the incidence of a CEO departure occurs within five years after the IPO. 
New CEO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO tenure is smaller than 2 years, and 0 otherwise 
MBA Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds an MBA degree, 0 otherwise. 
PhD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds a PhD, 0 otherwise. 
JD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds a JD degree, 0 otherwise. 
MD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds an MD, 0 otherwise. 
Panel D: Firm Fundamentals 
Firm age 
The number of years elapsed since firm’s foundation to IPO date, using foundation dates from Thomson Financial 
database as well as from the Field-Ritter dataset. The variable is transformed into the regressions by adding 1 and 
taking the natural logarithm. 
VC  Dummy variable equal to 1 for venture capital-backed firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Proceeds The natural logarithm of gross proceeds raised by the IPO estimated as shared offered times the offer price. 
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Size The natural logarithm of total assets for fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Overhang The ratio of shares retained by the pre-IPO shareholders over shares issued in the offering. 
Underwriter  
Dummy variable equal to 1 for most prestigious underwriters, 0 otherwise. Most reputable underwriters are those 
with a ranking score of 9.0 or above based on Jay Ritter’s underwriter (prestige) rankings. 
Internet  
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for IPOs of Internet firms, and 0 otherwise. Internet firms are classified those with 
business description containing any of the words “Internet”, “Online”, eBusiness”, “eCommerce”, and/or “Website”. 
Technology  
 
Dummy variable: one for IPO firms with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 
3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation 
equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 
4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 
7379 (software). 
Big 4 Auditor 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a big four audit firm, and zero otherwise. Big four audit firms 
include Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Nasdaq Dummy variable equal to 1 for NASDAQ-listed IPOs, and 0 otherwise. 
R&D Intensity It is the ratio of total R&D expense to total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Capital Expenditure It is the ratio of total capital expenditures to total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities over total assets in the fiscal year prior to IPO. 
EPS Dummy variable equal to 1 for positive earnings per share in the fiscal year prior to IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel E: Other Firm Characteristics 
Delist Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is delisted within five years after its IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
Survival Time The natural logarithm of the time to delist (survival time) which is measured in months. 
Market Return The compounded daily return on CRSP value-weighted index over the 20 trading days trailing the IPO. 
Board Governance  
Board Governance measure is constructed by taking the first factor of applying principal component analysis to the 
following variables: board independence is measured as the ratio of the number of independent outside directors to 
the total number of directors; a dummy variable equal to one if the board has a nominating committee that is 
composed solely of independent directors (and zero otherwise); the percentage of outside directors on the board that 
were appointed after the current CEO took office; the natural logarithm of the average number of other directorships 
held by independent directors serving on the board; a dummy variable, equal to one if the majority of outside 
directors on the board serve on three or more other boards; the natural logarithm of the number of board meetings; 
the natural logarithm of the number of directors serving on the board. 
Board Independence 
The ratio of the number of independent outside directors to the total number of directors. High Board Independence 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms’ number of independent members is above the sample median. 
Compensation 
Committee Quality 
Compensation committee quality is constructed by taking the first factor of applying principal component analysis 
to five proxies of remuneration committee index: : the compensation committee independence; the percentage of 
outside directors on the compensation committee that were appointed after the current CEO took office; a dummy 
variable, equal to one if the majority of outside directors on the compensation committee serve on three or more 
other boards (and equal to zero otherwise); the natural log of the number of directors serving on the compensation 
committee; the number of compensation committee meetings High Compensation Committee Quality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the index is above the sample median. 
HHI 
HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a market 
and then summing the resulting numbers. 
Diversified Index 
Factor score from Principle Component Analysis (PCA) using the natural logarithm of sales, the natural logarithm 
of the number of segments, the natural logarithm of the number of geographic segments, and the natural logarithm 
of firm age. 
Diversified Firms  Dummy variable equal to one if the Diversified Firms index is greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise 
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Table 1: IPO Distribution by Year and Industry 
This Table presents the distribution of overall sample and the five groups of IPO firms based on their listing status: survived, 
acquired, exchanged, liquidated, and dropped. Liquidated firms are those that are delisted due to company liquidation 
(delisting code 400 to 490). Exchanged firms are those that are delisted due to stop/change of trading on exchange (delisting 
code 300 to 390). Dropped firms are those that are dropped (delisting code from 500 to 599). Acquired firms are those that 
are delisted due to mergers and/or acquisitions (delisting code from 200 to 299). Survived firms are those that are still 
trading (delisting code of 100) five years after the issue date. Panel A presents the distributions of IPOs by trading status, 
while Panel B reports the distribution of IPO trading status by year. In Panel C the IPOs are distributed by industry. Panel D 
reports the cumulative survival rates calculated using the Kaplan-Meier method for one, three years and five years after IPO 
across the subsamples of highly and poorly compensated CEOs. 
Panel A: Distribution of IPOs by Trading Status from 2000-2012 
 From the IPO date to five years after the offering 
 N % 
Liquidated 2 0.17 
Exchanged 6 0.51 
Dropped 82 6.96 
Acquired 274 23.26 
Survived 814 69.10 
Total 1,178  
Panel B: Distribution of IPO Trading Status by Year 
Year 
All IPOs Dropped Acquired Exchanged Liquidated Survived 
N % % % % % 
2000 264 12.12 23.86 0.38 0.38 63.26 
2001 59 6.78 22.03 0.00 0.00 71.19 
2002 48 6.25 22.92 0.00 0.00 70.83 
2003 47 4.26 31.91 0.00 0.00 63.83 
2004 129 2.33 27.91 0.00 0.00 68.99 
2005 115 7.83 15.65 0.00 0.78 76.52 
2006 126 3.97 24.60 1.59 0.00 69.84 
2007 112 5.36 22.32 0.89 0.00 71.43 
2008 17 11.76 5.88 5.88 0.00 76.47 
2009 38 2.63 26.32 0.00 0.00 71.05 
2010 72 9.72 16.67 0.00 0.00 73.61 
2011 71 8.45 16.90 0.00 0.00 74.65 
2012 80 2.50 33.75 1.25 0.00 62.50 
Note: Delisting is tracked for five years after the IPO 
Panel C: Distribution of IPO Trading Status by Industry 
Industry (two-digit SIC codes) 
All IPOs Dropped Acquired Survived 
N % % % 
Oil and Gas  (13) 47 6.38 12.77 74.47 
Food Products  (20) 13 0.00 23.08 69.23 
Chemical Products - (28) 175 8.00 22.29 66.29 
Manufacturing  (30-34) 27 9.38 23.96 57.29 
Computer Equipment & 
Services  
(35, 73) 336 7.45 24.85 61.57 
Electronic Equipment  (36) 122 6.56 26.23 64.75 
Scientific Instruments  (38) 90 5.56 26.67 63.33 
Transportation & Public 
Utilities  
(41, 42, 
44-49) 
103 4.32 14.38 78.57 
Wholesale & Retail Trade  (50-59) 100 2.19 19.37 64.70 
Entertainment Services  
(70, 78, 
79) 
14 13.33 0.00 86.67 
Note: Delisting is tracked for five years after the IPO 
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Panel D: Kaplan-Meier Survival Rates of Total CEO Compensation By Issue Year 
  
All IPOs 
Firms with Highly Compensated 
CEOs 
Firms with Poorly Compensated 
CEOs 
  Cumulative Survival Rate Cumulative Survival Rate Cumulative Survival Rate 
Year Obs 1 Yr 3 Yrs 5Yrs 1 Yr 3 Yrs 5Yrs 1 Yr 3 Yrs 5Yrs 
2000 264 95.45 74.62 63.26 94.85 76.57 62.86 96.63 70.78 59.55 
2001 59 100.00 81.36 71.19 100.00 84.37 75.00 92.59 70.37 66.66 
2002 48 97.92 81.25 70.83 96.43 82.14 75.00 100.00 80.00 65.00 
2003 47 95.74 82.98 63.83 96.00 76.00 72.00 95.45 90.90 54.54 
2004 129 98.45 86.82 68.99 96.36 87.27 67.27 100.00 86.48 70.27 
2005 115 98.26 86.09 76.52 96.55 87.93 82.76 100.00 84.21 70.17 
2006 126 99.20 84.13 69.84 98.33 91.66 78.33 100.00 77.27 62.12 
2007 112 97.32 84.82 70.53 98.44 85.94 73.43 95.83 83.33 66.66 
2008 17 88.23 76.47 76.47 100.00 72.73 72.73 100.00 83.33 83.33 
2009 38 97.37 81.58 71.05 96.77 83.87 74.19 100.00 71.43 57.14 
2010 72 94.44 87.50 73.61 91.11 86.66 73.33 100.00 88.88 74.07 
2011 71 94.36 83.10 73.24 93.62 85.11 78.72 95.83 79.17 62.50 
2012 80 95.00 90.00 62.50 92.98 75.44 70.01 100.00 91.30 54.50 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This Table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of U.S. IPOs over the period from 2000 to 2012. Total CEO 
compensation and its components are presented in Panel A. CEO characteristics are illustrated in Panel B. Firm and offering 
characteristics are reported in Panel C. Tests on differences in means between the two sub-samples of IPO firms with a 
highly compensated CEO and those with a poorly compensated CEO are based on t-tests. The number of observations for 
each variable is 1,178. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: CEO Pay Components 
 All IPOs 
IPOs with a highly 
compensated CEO 
IPOs with a poorly 
compensated CEO 
Difference 
 Mean Mean Mean p-value 
CEO Total Pay  $1,297,351 $2,252,664 $342,038 0.0000 
Firm Pay Gap  $941,074 $1,466,525 $44,304 0.0000 
Other Executives’ Median 
Total Pay 
$541,937 $786,139 $297,734 0.0000 
Salary/Total Pay  0.52 0.32 0.71 0.0000 
Bonus/Total Pay 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.0000 
Stock Awards/Total Pay 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.0000 
Option Awards/Total Pay 0.17 0.25 0.09 0.0000 
Non-Equity Incentive 
Pay/Total Pay 
0.05 0.07 0.03 0.0000 
Other Pay/Total Pay 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.0000 
Panel B: CEO Characteristics 
CEO Tenure 3.97 3.88 4.10 0.2045 
CEO Duality 0.54 0.62 0.47 0.0000 
Founder 0.32 0.22 0.41 0.0000 
CEO Ownership 8.10 6.84 9.36 0.0022 
CEO Age 49.48 50.66 48.27 0.0000 
Generalist 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.0139 
Panel C: Firm and Offering Characteristics 
Firm Age 15.28 19.43 11.12 0.0000 
Proceeds 220.83 331.75 109.90 0.0000 
Size 4.82 5.46 4.04 0.0000 
Capital Expenditure 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.0052 
R&D Intensity 0.30 0.27 0.32 0.0176 
Leverage 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.3819 
EPS 0.50 0.56 0.44 0.0000 
Initial Returns 22.22 17.51 26.93 0.0003 
Overhang 4.46 4.19 4.75 0.0886 
Board Governance -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.4606 
HHI 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.2779 
Big 4 Auditor 0.83 0.86 0.78 0.0019 
VC 0.53 0.41 0.64 0.0000 
Underwriter 0.35 0.47 0.23 0.0000 
Technology 0.40 0.47 0.32 0.0000 
Internet  0.11 0.10 0.12 0.2023 
Nasdaq 0.72 0.60 0.83 0.0000 
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Table 3: Estimation of the Cox Proportional Hazards Model of Probability of Failure 
This Table illustrates the estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure. Our dependent 
variable is whether or not a firm survived five years after its IPO. Panel A reports the results of the effect of total CEO 
compensation (and its components) on failure risk, while Panel B presents the results of the effect of firm pay gap on 
failure risk. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. Regressions 
control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. Z-statistics are included in the 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. 
Panel A: The Effect of Total CEO Compensation (Pay) of Failure Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.20*** 
(-2.81) 
0.820     
Short-Term CEO Pay   
-0.19* 
(-1.93) 
0.823   
Long-Term CEO Pay     
-0.09*** 
(-2.93) 
0.905 
CEO Tenure 
-0.07*** 
(-3.13) 
0.935 
-0.07*** 
(-3.14) 
0.934 
-0.07*** 
(-2.87) 
0.933 
CEO Duality 
-1.53*** 
(-8.95) 
0.215 
-1.49*** 
(-8.73) 
0.225 
-1.40*** 
(-7.55) 
0.245 
Founder 
0.03 
(0.19) 
1.028 
0.06 
(0.38) 
1.059 
-0.03 
(-0.18) 
0.970 
CEO Ownership 
0.01 
(0.29) 
1.014 
0.03 
(0.57) 
1.029 
-0.02 
(-0.31) 
0.982 
Initial Returns 
0.01* 
(1.82) 
1.002 
0.01* 
(1.66) 
1.002 
0.01 
(1.37) 
1.002 
Big 4 Auditor 
0.33 
(1.65) 
1.399 
0.27 
(1.58) 
1.308 
0.12 
(0.63) 
1.125 
Leverage 
0.04 
(0.22) 
1.037 
0.05 
(0.30) 
1.051 
0.05 
(0.26) 
1.049 
Size 
0.16*** 
(3.00) 
1.173 
0.15*** 
(2.78) 
1.165 
0.06 
(0.93) 
1.060 
EPS 
-0.13 
(-0.94) 
0.879 
-0.11 
(-0.78) 
0.898 
-0.15 
(-1.04) 
0.856 
VC 
0.54*** 
(3.32) 
1.710 
0.50*** 
(3.02) 
1.648 
0.47** 
(2.53) 
1.596 
Technology 
-0.03 
(-0.21) 
0.965 
-0.06 
(-0.36) 
0.939 
-0.17 
(-0.89) 
0.840 
Internet 
0.23 
(1.30) 
1.262 
0.25 
(1.40) 
1.283 
0.29 
(1.51) 
1.343 
Underwriter 
-0.26* 
(-1.70) 
0.766 
-0.31* 
(-1.96) 
0.736 
-0.28* 
(-1.66) 
0.759 
Nasdaq 
0.54*** 
(3.07) 
1.725 
0.58*** 
(3.30) 
1.795 
0.47** 
(2.47) 
1.601 
Overhang 
0.01 
(0.39) 
1.003 
0.01 
(0.34) 
1.003 
0.01 
(1.07) 
1.008 
Market Return 
1.09 
(1.27) 
2.974 
1.95 
(1.18) 
7.029 
1.30 
(1.20) 
3.669 
Board Governance 
-0.35*** 
(-9.75) 
0.706 
-0.35*** 
(-9.79) 
0.702 
-0.36*** 
(-9.05) 
0.693 
HHI 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.998 
0.06 
(0.30) 
1.067 
0.09 
(0.40) 
1.098 
Capital Expenditure 
-0.73 
(-0.77) 
0.428 
-0.97 
(-0.99) 
0.378 
-0.84 
(-0.77) 
0.432 
R&D Intensity 
0.37** 
(2.47) 
1.452 
0.39** 
(2.57) 
1.476 
0.39** 
(2.35) 
1.482 
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  Y  
Chi-Square 337.41  330.00  403.45  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  1,178  
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Panel B: The Effect of Pay Gap on Failure Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Total Pay Gap 
-0.13*** 
(-2.64) 
0.874     
Short-Term Pay Gap   
0.01 
(0.41) 
1.010   
Long-Term Pay Gap     
-0.06*** 
(-3.62) 
0.942 
CEO Tenure 
-0.07*** 
(-2.91) 
0.933 
-0.07*** 
(-3.23) 
0.932 
-0.07*** 
(-3.21) 
0.933 
CEO Duality 
-1.39*** 
(-7.40) 
0.249 
-1.47*** 
(-8.72) 
0.228 
-1.49*** 
(-8.84) 
0.226 
Founder 
-0.02 
(-0.13) 
0.978 
0.06 
(0.43) 
1.066 
0.04 
(0.27) 
1.040 
CEO Ownership 
0.02 
(0.33) 
1.019 
0.02 
(0.49) 
1.025 
0.02 
(0.38) 
1.019 
Initial Returns 
0.01 
(1.06) 
1.002 
0.01* 
(1.89) 
1.002 
0.01* 
(1.84) 
1.002 
Big 4 Auditor 
0.20 
(1.10) 
1.223 
0.24* 
(1.65) 
1.271 
0.22 
(1.01) 
1.246 
Leverage 
0.19 
(1.12) 
1.216 
0.06 
(0.36) 
1.062 
0.05 
(0.30) 
1.051 
Size 
0.20*** 
(3.29) 
1.225 
0.11** 
(2.19) 
1.117 
0.12** 
(2.38) 
1.127 
EPS 
-0.11 
(-0.76) 
0.889 
-0.12 
(-0.86) 
0.889 
-0.11 
(-0.79) 
0.898 
VC 
0.55*** 
(2.98) 
1.737 
0.54*** 
(3.40) 
1.727 
0.55*** 
(3.45) 
1.743 
Technology 
0.09 
(0.49) 
1.100 
-0.02 
(-0.14) 
0.976 
-0.03 
(-0.21) 
0.965 
Internet 
0.39* 
(1.88) 
1.474 
0.26 
(1.44) 
1.292 
0.25 
(1.43) 
1.290 
Underwriter 
-0.31* 
(-1.78) 
0.733 
-0.33 
(-2.16) 
0.716 
-0.34** 
(-2.22) 
0.708 
Nasdaq 
0.79*** 
(3.98) 
2.222 
0.58*** 
(3.27) 
1.780 
0.57*** 
(3.20) 
1.762 
Overhang 
0.01 
(0.96) 
1.007 
0.01 
(0.38) 
1.003 
0.01 
(0.37) 
1.003 
Market Return 
1.03 
(0.71) 
2.801 
-1.81 
(-1.48) 
0.164 
1.54* 
(1.10) 
4.664 
Board Governance 
-0.36*** 
(-9.15) 
0.693 
-0.35*** 
(-9.74) 
0.705 
-0.35*** 
(-9.74) 
0.706 
HHI 
-0.08 
(-0.36) 
0.918 
0.02 
(0.10) 
1.021 
0.02 
(0.08) 
1.018 
Capital Expenditure 
-0.64 
(-0.63) 
0.526 
-0.86 
(-0.89) 
0.424 
-0.85 
(-0.89) 
0.426 
R&D Intensity 
0.43** 
(2.49) 
1.533 
0.38** 
(2.50) 
1.459 
0.38** 
(2.54) 
1.466 
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  Y  
Chi-Square 287.01  329.66  330.35  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  1,178  
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Table 4: CEO Departures on the Post-IPO Period 
This Table presents the occurrence of CEO departure within five years after the IPO date and how it affects the period in which 
the incidence of delisting is evaluated. Panel A reports the CEO turnover rates for the post-IPO period. Panel B displays the 
executive pay effect on IPO failure under the new tracking period which is equal to the minimum of the difference between the 
IPO date and CEO departure date, the IPO date and delisting date, and the fifth anniversary. Panel C presents the executive pay 
effect on IPO failure for the subsamples in which the CEO is retained. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects 
whose coefficients are suppressed. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: CEO Turnover Rate 
Post-IPO Periods No. % 
1 74 6.28 
2 164 13.92 
3 143 12.14 
4 116 9.85 
5 108 9.17 
Total CEO Turnover 605 51.36% 
Panel B: Tracking Period Accounting for the Incidence of CEO Turnover 
 (1) (2) 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.21*** 
(-2.82) 
 
Total Pay Gap  
-0.19*** 
(-3.73) 
Control variables Y Y 
Industry & Year FE Y Y 
Number of Obs. 1,178 1,178 
Chi-Square 195.58 175.44 
Panel C: Exclusion of All Firms where CEO Turnover Occurs Prior to the Five-Year IPO Anniversary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CEO Retention Rate CEO Retention Rate CEO Retention Rate CEO Retention Rate 
 
> 1 year > 2 years > 3 years > 4 years 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.21*** 
(-2.75) 
 
-0.21*** 
(-2.75) 
 
-0.19* 
(-1.77) 
 
-0.22* 
(-1.88) 
 
Total Pay Gap  
-0.21*** 
(-2.82) 
 
-0.21*** 
(-2.82) 
 
-0.18* 
(-1.85) 
 
-0.19* 
(-1.90) 
Control 
Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry & 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of 
Obs. 1,105 1,105 937 937 794 794 675 675 
Chi-Square 352.94 300.60 352.94 300.60 225.50 192.34 184.40 164.74 
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Table 5: Controlling for CEO and Firm Characteristics  
This Table illustrates the estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure and time-to failure. Our 
dependent variable is whether or not a firm survived five years after its IPO. Models (1) and (2) control for additional CEO and 
firm characteristics: CEO Gender, CEO Age, CEO Power, CEO educational attainments (MBA, PhD, HD, and MD), and 
Compensation Committee Quality and Diversified Firms. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.18** 
(-2.31) 
0.832 
 
 
Total Pay Gap 
 
 
-0.13** 
(-2.34) 
0.874 
Diversified Firms  
-0.88*** 
(-4.93) 
0.414 
-0.88*** 
(-4.37) 
0.413 
Generalist 
-0.05 
(-0.38) 
0.945 
0.01 
(0.07) 
1.011 
CEO Gender 
0.01 
(0.03) 
1.007 
-0.09 
(-0.35) 
0.914 
CEO Age 
-0.01 
(-1.04) 
0.990 
-0.01 
(-1.28) 
0.985 
CEO Power 
0.15 
(0.71) 
1.162 
0.21 
(0.91) 
1.238 
Compensation Committee 
Quality 
-0.14** 
(-2.65) 
0.869 
-0.12* 
(-1.97) 
0.887 
MBA 
-0.14 
(-0.90) 
0.872 
-0.16 
(-0.94) 
0.850 
PhD 
0.27 
(1.29) 
1.316 
0.27 
(1.12) 
1.315 
JD 
-0.09 
(-0.29) 
0.915 
-0.13 
(-0.36) 
0.873 
MD 
0.07 
(0.21) 
1.072 
-0.03 
(-0.07) 
0.974 
Other Control Variables  Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 337.47  285.03  
Number of Observations 1,178  1,178  
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Table 6: Endogeneity Test-Instrumental Variable-Probit 
This table reports results from Instrumental Variable-Probit estimation in which failure risk is our dependent variable and Total 
Pay and Pay Gap are our main independent variables. Failure risk is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm survived 
five years after its IPO. Panel A presents the first-stage results, while Panel B displays the second-stage results. Regressions 
control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. T-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: First-Stage Results of IV-Probit 
 (1) (2) 
Industry Median Total CEO Pay 
0.66*** 
(11.97) 
 
Industry Median Total Pay Gap  
0.65*** 
(5.89) 
Diversified Firms 
0.26*** 
(3.57) 
0.21 
(1.47) 
Generalist 
0.16** 
(2.17) 
0.08 
(0.63) 
CEO Tenure 
0.01 
(0.99) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
CEO Duality 
-0.06 
(-0.31) 
-0.32 
(-1.44) 
Founder 
-0.23*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.48*** 
(-4.02) 
CEO Ownership 
-0.01 
(-0.58) 
0.02 
(0.63) 
Big 4 Auditor 
0.04 
(0.56) 
0.03 
(0.24) 
Leverage 
-0.07 
(-1.23) 
-0.09 
(-1.06) 
Size 
0.19*** 
(8.05) 
0.20*** 
(6.24) 
EPS 
-0.05 
(-1.52) 
-0.09 
(-1.43) 
VC 
0.03 
(0.33) 
-0.24*** 
(-2.67) 
Technology 
-0.12** 
(-2.01) 
-0.05 
(-0.77) 
Internet 
-0.02 
(-0.35) 
0.07 
(0.58) 
Underwriter 
0.22** 
(2.53) 
0.22** 
(2.14) 
Nasdaq 
-0.03 
(-0.47) 
0.10 
(0.89) 
Board Governance 
-0.02 
(-0.98) 
-0.02 
(-1.01) 
HHI 
-0.18*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.02 
(-0.18) 
Capital Expenditure 
0.37 
(0.87) 
0.62 
(1.55) 
R&D Intensity 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.09 
(0.68) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y 
N 1,178 1,178 
Adjusted    0.3858 0.2931 
Panel B: Second-Stage Results of IV-PROBIT 
 (1) (2) 
Total CEO Compensation 
-0.39*** 
(-2.91) 
 
Total Firm Gap  
-0.24** 
(-2.52) 
Control Variables Y Y 
Industry & Year FE Y Y 
Wald Test of Exogeneity (p-value) 0.54 (0.1214) 0.53 (0.1312) 
F-statistic 65.29*** 43.02*** 
Number of Observations 1,178 1,178 
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Table 7: Sample with Alternative CEO Tenure Cutoffs 
This Table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure. Our dependent variable is 
whether or not a firm survived five years after its IPO. Model (1) presents the effect of managerial incentives on failure risk for 
whole sample, while models (3), (4), and (5) report the results for the subsamples in which the minimum CEO tenure is greater 
than one, two, three, and four years. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. Z-
statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All CEOs 
CEO Tenure CEO Tenure CEO Tenure CEO Tenure 
 
> 1 year > 2 years > 3 years > 4 years 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.20** 
(-2.81) 
 
-0.28*** 
(-2.89) 
 
-0.30*** 
(-2.68) 
 
-0.28** 
(-2.11) 
 
-0.39** 
(-2.57) 
 
Total Pay Gap  
-0.13*** 
(-2.64) 
 
-0.18*** 
(-2.83) 
 
-0.21*** 
(-2.82) 
 
-0.18*** 
(-2.78) 
 
-0.25*** 
(-2.85) 
Control 
Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry & Year 
FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of Obs. 1,178 1,178 831 831 677 677 541 541 448 448 
Chi-Square 337.41 287.01 165.98 147.20 140.89 125.43 126.98 108.03 113.59 89.39 
 
 
 
Table 8: Propensity Score Matching  
This table presents the analysis on the relation between Highly Compensated CEOs (Large Pay Gaps) and Failure Risk using the 
One-to-One Propensity Score Matching (PSM) procedure. Panel A reports univariate analysis for 323 firms with highly 
compensated CEOs and 323 firms with poorly compensated CEOs. The variables used to estimate differences in means are tested 
based on t-test. Panel B displays the estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure on the matched 
samples. Our dependent variable is whether or not a firm survived five years after its IPO. We use the nearest-neighbor estimator 
(nnmatch) from Abadie, Drukker, Leber, Herr and Inmbens (2004). We use the following control variables for both cases (total 
compensation and firm pay gap): Company Age, Size, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Generalist, Big 4 Auditor, Founder, Leverage, 
EPS, VC, Technology, Internet, Underwriter, and Nasdaq. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Mean Differences Between Treatment and Control Group of PSM Sample (N=646) 
 Treatment Control Difference (p-value) 
CEO Tenure 4.25 3.78 0.2232 
CEO Duality 0.55 0.55 1.0000 
Founder 0.29 0.32 0.1365 
CEO Ownership 7.85 8.10 0.8418 
CEO Age 50.39 49.56 0.0752 
Generalist 0.58 0.59 0.8109 
Firm Age 13.97 13.04 0.4683 
Size 4.59 4.53 0.6500 
Proceeds 204.12 199.23 0.1655 
Capital Expenditure 0.05 0.04 0.1164 
R&D Intensity 0.25 0.30 0.1341 
Leverage 0.32 0.34 0.6753 
EPS 0.51 0.52 0.8136 
Initial Returns 22.97 25.29 0.5540 
Overhang 4.57 4.29 0.6332 
Big 4 Auditor 0.85 0.83 0.5270 
VC 0.58 0.55 0.3835 
Underwriter 0.27 0.30 0.2963 
Technology 0.45 0.42 0.4762 
Internet  0.12 0.13 0.7192 
Nasdaq 0.82 0.79 0.0798 
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Panel B: Estimation of the Cox Proportional Hazards Model of Probability of Failure on Matched Samples 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.24** 
(-2.10) 
0.782   
Total Pay Gap   
-0.16* 
(-1.86) 
0.852 
CEO Tenure 
-0.05* 
(-1.66) 
0.948 
-0.08** 
(-2.12) 
0.921 
CEO Duality 
-1.49*** 
(-4.73) 
0.224 
-1.41*** 
(-4.61) 
0.244 
Founder 
0.32 
(1.28) 
1.379 
0.06 
(0.26) 
1.066 
CEO Ownership 
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
0.958 
0.02 
(0.17) 
1.017 
Initial Returns 
0.01 
(1.45) 
1.003 
0.01 
(0.50) 
1.001 
Big 4 Auditor 
0.37 
(1.61) 
1.448 
0.28 
(1.32) 
1.323 
Leverage 
0.48 
(1.49) 
1.613 
0.40 
(1.33) 
1.498 
Size 
0.20* 
(1.83) 
1.225 
0.07 
(0.66) 
1.073 
EPS 
-0.23 
(-0.96) 
0.791 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.993 
VC 
1.08*** 
(3.60) 
2.953 
0.83*** 
(2.64) 
2.287 
Technology 
-0.02 
(-0.06) 
0.982 
-0.18 
(-0.67) 
0.832 
Internet 
0.36 
(1.16) 
1.432 
0.35 
(1.07) 
1.427 
Underwriter 
-0.69** 
(-2.51) 
0.498 
-0.34 
(-1.25) 
0.714 
Nasdaq 
0.93** 
(2.49) 
2.535 
0.61* 
(1.93) 
1.848 
Overhang 
0.01 
(0.90) 
1.008 
0.01 
(0.29) 
1.005 
Market Return 
-0.12 
(-0.04) 
0.888 
0.15 
(0.48) 
Xxx 
Board Governance 
-0.40*** 
(-6.55) 
0.666 
-0.39*** 
(-6.14) 
0.677 
HHI 
0.61 
(1.38) 
1.839 
-0.06 
(-0.19) 
0.935 
Capital Expenditure 
-0.97 
(-0.49) 
0.380 
-2.33 
(-1.17) 
0.097 
R&D Intensity 
0.32 
(1.20) 
1.385 
0.30 
(1.09) 
1.349 
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 148.24  149.09  
Number of Observations 646  724  
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Table 9: Cross-Sectional Tests 
This Table illustrates the estimation of the Cox Proportional Hazards Models of Probability of failure and time-to-failure. Panel A 
and B present sub-sample results on the effect of CEO compensation on failure risk using a set of CEO and governance 
characteristics, while Panel C displays sub-sample results of Pay Gap on failure risk using characteristics indicative of promotion 
probability. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. Z-statistics are included in 
the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
Panel A: Effect of CEO Attributes on Total CEO Pay 
 (1) (2) 
 Generalist Specialist Young Old 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.11 
(-1.27) 
-0.37*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.25*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.07 
(-0.63) 
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y 
Industry & Year 
FE 
Y Y Y Y 
Chi-Square 249.76 127.37 194.80 161.94 
Number of 
Observations 
588 590 585 593 
Panel B: Effects of Governance Characteristics on Total CEO Pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Founder 
Non-
Founder 
Powerful 
CEOs 
Non-
Powerful 
CEOs 
High Board 
Indep. 
Low Board 
Indep. 
High Comp. 
Committee 
Quality 
Low Comp. 
Committee 
Quality 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.21 
(-1.42) 
-0.19** 
(-2.35) 
-0.06* 
(-1.77) 
-0.21** 
(-2.65) 
-0.24*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.14 
(-1.41) 
-0.16** 
(-2.38) 
-0.06 
(-1.16) 
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry & 
Year FE 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Chi-Square 142.91 237.56 186.45 174.40 65.17 232.28 252.70 224.50 
Number of 
Observations 
377 801 678 500 807 371 594 584 
Panel C: Cross-Sectional Tests: Total Pay Gap 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Founder Non-Founder Generalist Specialist Young Old 
Total Pay Gap 
-0.05 
(-1.10) 
-0.12** 
(-2.03) 
-0.12** 
(-2.44) 
-0.07 
(-1.30) 
-0.04 
(-1.41) 
-0.19** 
(-2.21) 
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry & 
Year FE 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Chi-Square 158.40 210.18 221.31 95.99 164.77 158.26 
Number of 
Observations 
377 801 588 590 585 593 
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Table 10: The Effect of Managerial Incentives on Post-IPO Return Volatility 
This Table shows the results of additional tests using post-IPO volatility measures. Panel A displays the summary statistics of 
Post-IPO Idiosyncratic Return Volatility. Panel B and C present the results of the impact of total CEO compensation and firm 
pay gap on Post-IPO Return Volatility. Post-IPO return volatility is the dependent variable and is computed as the standard 
deviation of residuals from a firm-specific market model estimated over +5 to +26 (trading) days post-IPO in Column (1), +5 to 
+63 days post-IPO in Column (2), +5 to +126 days post-IPO in Column (3), and +5 to +189 days post-IPO in Column (4), 5 to 
+252 days post-IPO in Column (5), 5 to +504 days post-IPO in Column (6), 5 to +756 days post-IPO in Column (7) (first week is 
ignored since there may be unusual trading activity because of share flipping).  Control variables are the same as in Table 3. T-
statistics are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by industry and 
year. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Post-IPO Return Volatility 
 
IPOs with Highly 
Compensated 
CEOs 
IPOs with 
Poorly 
Compensated 
CEOs 
Mean 
Difference 
IPOs with 
Large Pay 
Disparities 
IPOs with 
Small Pay 
Disparities 
Mean 
Difference 
 Mean Mean p-value Mean  Mean p-value 
+5 to +21 days post-IPO 0.03 0.05 0.0000 0.03 0.04 0.0007 
+5 to +63 days post-IPO 0.04 0.05 0.0000 0.03 0.04 0.0002 
+5 to +126 days post-IPO 0.04 0.05 0.0000 0.04 0.05 0.0006 
+5 to +189 days post-IPO 0.04 0.05 0.0000 0.04 0.05 0.0035 
+5 to +252 days post-IPO 0.04 0.05 0.0000 0.04 0.05 0.0031 
+5 to +504 days post-IPO 0.16 0.20 0.0000 0.17 0.19 0.0161 
+5 to +756 days post-IPO 0.16 0.20 0.0000 0.17 0.19 0.0164 
Panel B: Impact of Total CEO Pay on Post-IPO Return Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.01*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.01*** 
(-6.04) 
-0.01** 
(-2.17) 
-0.01 
(-0.84) 
-0.01 
(-1.18) 
-0.01 
(-0.43) 
0.01 
(0.38) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 705 705 705 705 705 634 596 
Adjusted    0.5444 0.6498 0.7325 0.7425 0.7439 0.5185 0.4045 
Panel C: Impact of Total Pay Gap on Post-IPO Return Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Total Pay Gap 
-0.01*** 
(-6.31) 
-0.01*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.01 
(-1.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.75) 
-0.01 
(-1.26) 
-0.01 
(-0.79) 
0.01 
(0.64) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 705 705 705 705 705 634 596 
Adjusted    0.5530 0.6584 0.7233 0.7545 0.7440 0.5187 0.4044 
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Table 11: The Effect of Managerial Incentives on Post-IPO Operating Performance 
This Table shows the results of additional tests using three post-IPO performance measures as dependent variables. Panel A 
displays results of the impact of Total CEO Pay. Panel B presents results of the impact of Total Pay Gap. Our first measure, Tobin’s 
Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book values of assets. Our second measure, ROA is operating income divided by total 
assets. Finally, our third measure, ΔROA is the change in the levels of ROA between each post-issue year and the pre-IPO fiscal 
year, i.e.,     –               , where t represent a post-IPO fiscal year end. All performance measures are industry adjusted at 
the two-digit SIC (Standard Industry Classification) system and averaged over the next three years after the IPO. Control variables 
are the same as in Table 3. T-statistics are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, 
and clustered by industry and year. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Impact of Total CEO Pay on Post-Operating Performance 
 Tobin’s Q ROA ΔROA  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Total CEO Pay 
0.15** 
(2.12) 
0.05* 
(1.80) 
0.04** 
(2.22) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 588 588 497 
Adjusted    .0.3145 0.5813 0.2137 
Panel B: Impact of Total Pay Gap on Post-Operating Performance 
 Tobin’s Q ROA ΔROA  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Total Pay Gap 
0.03* 
(1.87) 
0.03* 
(1.78) 
0.09** 
(2.58) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 588 588 497 
Adjusted    0.3374 0.5915 0.1950 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250415 
53 
 
Appendix B: Figures 
Figure 1: Time Trend of Compensation and Pay Gap 
 
Figure 2: CEO Compensation Structure By Year 
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Supplemental File for “Managerial Incentives and Firm 
Survival” 
 
This Appendix reports supplemental and robustness tests to accompany the results in “Managerial 
Incentives and Firm Survival: Rent Extraction or Optimal Contracting?” Section 1 reports the 
descriptive statistics of CEO compensation, firm fundamentals and other variables for the Total Pay 
Gap sub-groups. In addition, it displays the trend of compensation and its structure by year as well 
as the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates and Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimates. Section 2 
presents the results from the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) method. Section 3 presents the results 
from the Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure based on alternative measures of 
failure risk as well as of the tournament incentives. Section 4 presents the results from the Cox 
proportional hazards models of probability of failure based on alternative industry definitions. 
Section 5 reports the results of Heckman Two-Stage Method. Section 6 presents a supplementary 
test for endogeneity by using a bivariate probit estimation model. Section 7 presents the results for 
the Impact of Managerial Incentives on post-IPO market performance using the factor regression as 
well as the buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) as measures of post-IPO performance. Section 8 presents 
the results for the Impact of Managerial Incentives on post-IPO firm investment Policies.  
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1.  Descriptive Analysis 
1.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table IA1 compares the values of our compensation variables over two samples: 
firms with large and firms with small pay gaps. Panel B of Table IA1 describes the average CEO 
profile for the large and small pay gaps sub-samples. Panel C of Table IA1 presents the firm and 
IPO characteristics for the sub-samples of firms with large and small pay disparities.  
Panel B shows that older CEOs, who also are the Chairperson, are concentrated in firms 
with large pay gaps, while founder-led firms have lower pay gaps. Panel C shows that while older 
firms employ tournament incentives, this is not the case for larger firms.  It is also worth noting that 
firms with large pay disparities attract top-tier investment banks and have less backing by VCs. In 
addition, firms with large pay disparities are associated with lower initial aftermarket returns and 
have less risky business models (as indicated from Technology, Internet, and Nasdaq). 
 
1.2 Dynamic Evolution of Managerial Pay and Plots of Hazard and Survival Functions 
In the main text, we provided some cross-sectional evidence about the managerial pay and 
firm or CEO characteristics. What is more interesting, perhaps, is how our managerial pay 
measures evolve over time and how their dynamic behavior interacts with the probability of 
delisting. Figure 1 and Figure 2 from the main text suggest that an increased reliance on contingent 
forms of compensation such as stock options. Are these patterns an outcome of staggered boards or 
equilibrium in the labor market?  
We explore this question using graphical depictions based one hazard and survival functions 
for firms with highly versus low absolute and relative CEO pay. The plots of Nelson-Aalen 
cumulative hazard and Kaplan-Meier survival estimates are provided in Figure 2 and 3, 
respectively. In Figures 2a and 3a, the hazard function of IPO firms with a highly compensated 
CEO (or large pay disparity) are below than those of firms with a poorly compensated CEO (or 
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small pay disparity). The gaps widen slightly but steadily as the length of time beyond the issue 
year increases. On the other hand, as can be seen from Figures 2b and 3b, the survival functions of 
IPO firms with highly compensated CEOs (or large pay disparities) are consistently above those 
firms with poorly compensated CEOs (or small pay disparities). Also, the difference between the 
survival functions for both total CEO compensation and firm pay gap widens after 2005. Overall, 
the plots of survival and hazard functions indicate that IPO firms with a highly compensated CEO 
(large pay gap) have a more attractive survival profile than firms with a poorly compensated CEO 
(low pay gap). 
 
2. Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) 
 For robustness checking and comparison purposes, we also use another survival model, the 
Accelerated Failure Time (AFT), to examine the determinants of the survival rates. In contrast with 
the Cox model, the AFT method allows the impact of the independent variables on survival time to 
vary over the post-IPO period depending on the length of time since listing (Hensler et al., 1997; 
Jain and Kini, 2000). The AFT model is a parametric model typically expressed in terms of a log-
linear function with respect to survival time (e.g., Hensler et al., 1997):
22
 
 
  (  )                                                                   (1) 
 
where Ln(Ti) is the natural logarithm of the survival time or time-to-failure (measured in months). 
In this model, the exponential of the coefficient is an ‘acceleration factor’, also known as the time 
ratio. The time ratio measures the extent to which changes in the independent variables speed up or 
slow down the occurrence of delisting. A positive coefficient represents a time ratio greater than 
one, indicating that an increase in the covariate increases survival time, while a negative coefficient 
                                                          
22
 Being parametric models, AFT models require a specific underlying distribution (i.e., Weibull, Gama, lognormal 
etc.). Unreported results for the Akaike information criterion (AIC) identify Weibull as the most appropriate 
distribution with the lowest AIC value. 
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(a time ratio below one) shows that an increase in the covariate decreases survival time (Espenlaub 
et al., 2012, 2016).  
 
2.1 Results from AFT Method 
Our results show that high CEO remuneration and corporate tournament-based incentives 
enhance IPO survival. In this section, we further test this hypothesis, by estimating an AFT model 
of IPO time-to-failure. Within this approach, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
survival time or time-to-failure. Thus, a positive (negative) coefficient in the independent variable 
of interest implies a longer (shorter) period of survival. 
In Table IA2 we present both the coefficient estimates and the time ratios together with 
their associated p-values. The results indicate a positive association between total CEO 
compensation and survival time. The coefficient for total CEO remuneration is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. On average, the survival time of firms with CEO pay in the 75
th
 
percentile increases by 26.33%, which translates to an increase of 12.54 months of survival time, 
compared to firms with CEO pay in the 25
th
 percentile. Similarly, the coefficient on the firm pay 
disparity is positive and significant at the 5% level. Specifically, the survival time of firms with pay 
gaps in the 75
th
 percentile is increased by 28.12%, which translates to an increase of 13.40 months 
of survival time, compared to firms with pay gaps in the 25
th 
percentile.
23
 The results regarding the 
control variables and their impact on time-to-failure are similar but opposite in sign to those in the 
Cox models.  
 
 
                                                          
23
 The first estimate represents the change in the time ratio for a firm that moves from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile of the distribution of the natural logarithm of total CEO compensation and is calculated as follows: 
exp(0.15 x 1.23) -1 = 26.33%. Similarly, the change in the time ratio for a firm that moves in the interquartile range of 
the distribution of the natural logarithm of pay gap is calculated as follows: exp(0.14 x 1.77) -1 = 28.12%. This 
translates into 12.54 months for CEO pay (i.e., 26.33% x 47.64 months for survival time in the 25th percentile) and 
13.40 months for CEO pay gap (i.e., 28.12% x 47.64 months for survival time in the 25th percentile). 
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3. Alternative Definitions 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results in various ways. We begin by 
adopting alternative definitions of the dependent variable (i.e., survivors versus non survivors) 
followed by alternative definitions for the tournament-based incentives variable. 
 
3.1 Re-classification of M&A Stock Delisting 
In the baseline tests, we classified mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as genuine delistings 
(non-survivors), thus treating M&A delistings in the same way as delistings for other, negative 
reasons. However, not all M&A-related delistings are necessarily bad news to investors of target 
companies. Zingales (1995) shows that an IPO may be the first step in the gradual sale of a 
company. In contrast, Fama and French (2004) note that managers who enjoy private benefits may 
be reluctant to cede control unless forced to do so because of financial distress, an argument 
suggesting that low-quality IPO firms are more likely to be acquired. Given this ambiguity, we 
examine the robustness of our results by treating some delistings due to M&A as “censored 
survivors”, that is, stocks that are still considered to be alive at the end of our study period.  
 To identify the censored survivors, we acknowledge that, because of poor performance or 
financial difficulties, some M&A delistings are typically less attractive to target shareholders than 
other. Following Espenlaub et al. (2012, 2016), we seek to differentiate such poorly performing 
M&A stocks from the remainder by imposing a performance criterion. To do so, we locate M&A 
delisting of well-performing companies either in the year prior to their IPO or in the year prior to 
their acquisition by ranking companies on the basis of four performance measures: cash to total 
assets, total liabilities to total assets, operating income to total assets, current assets to current 
liabilities. Companies that rank above (below) the median based on all four indicators are 
considered censored survivors (non-survivors or failures).  
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Our final alternative definition of survival is concerned with the time to delisting following 
the issue date. Bhattacharrya et al. (2015) show that, in contrast to the common perception that risk 
to survival decreases as a firm ages, public firms need to survive for three years after their IPO 
before their survival rate starts diminishing. Based on this finding, the authors suggest that the first 
three years after a firm goes public are critical to its long-term survival. Following this suggestion, 
we re-evaluate the relationship between managerial incentives and IPO survival by identifying 
whether each firm continues to be listed three after the issue date instead of five.  The results of 
our robustness checks are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A and B (Table IA3) and are 
qualitatively similar to our baseline findings.  
Notwithstanding the above evidence, one might still argue that true failures should be 
considered as cases of firms that involve delisting only for negative reasons (i.e., liquidated or 
dropped). Following Jain and Kini (2000), we consider all M&A delistings as survivors, and hence, 
classify as failures only the companies that were liquidated or dropped. We continue to find that 
CEO compensation and CEO pay gap have a significant negative impact on failure risk (column 3 
of Panel A and B). Finally, column (4) of Panel A and B of Table IA3 reveals that the relationship 
between our managerial incentives measure and IPO failures continues to be negative, albeit 
weaker both in economic and statistical terms. 
 
3.2 Alternative Measures of Tournament-Based Incentives   
In the baseline tests, we have used the CEO pay-gap measure of Kale et al. (2009) as our 
proxy for tournament-based incentives, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
difference between a CEO’s total compensation and the median value of the compensation of the 
firm’s other senior executives in a given fiscal year. This approach has intuitive appeal as it roughly 
captures the increase in a non-CEO executive’s compensation after winning a tournament (i.e., “the 
typical size of the prize”). Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the use of the median executive pay 
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could overestimate (underestimate) tournament-based incentives if only one or two executives have 
significantly higher (lower) compensation and higher (lower) chances of obtaining promotions than 
the remaining top executive members (Masulis and Zhang, 2013). To eliminate this error in our pay 
disparity measure, we use the natural logarithm of the difference in pay between the CEO and the 
mean of the other members of the top management team.  
 Another potential concern with our main measure of tournament-based incentives is that it 
may be highly correlated with a particular major determinant of CEO compensation, firm size, 
since pay differentials tend to increase with firm size (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). A pay-gap-based 
promotion metric is therefore subject to the concern that the link between tournament incentives 
and IPO failure is contaminated by firm size. To mitigate such concerns, we disentangle the pay 
disparity measure from firm size by using an alternative pay disparity measure:  the CEO pay slice 
(CPS), calculated as the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top three executives paid to 
the CEO (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2011).   
Our results in Panel C (Table IA3) remain unchanged, as we continue to find significant 
results (at the 5% level) for the mean gap between the CEO and the next tier of executives, both in 
the Cox and the AFT models. The results in Panel D of Table IA3 reveal that an increased CPS 
decreases IPO failure rates and increases survival time.  
 
 4.  Alternative Industry Definitions 
In our baseline tests, we used the Fama-French 17 industry classification scheme to control 
for time-invariant unobservable industry characteristics that may be driving the association between 
compensation-based incentives and IPO survival. To examine the robustness of our main results we 
use alternative industry definitions, specifically, the Fama-French 30 and Fama-French 49 industry 
classifications or exclude the industry fixed effects. In Table IA4, we compare the results under 
these schemes and find that our reported results are not materially affected by industry sector. 
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5. Two-stage Heckman Process 
To further address the issue of endogeneity and self-selection bias associated with our 
managerial incentive variables, we estimate a two-stage Heckman (1979) model (e.g., Espenlaub, 
2016). In the first-stage, we estimate two probit models: one modelling for the likelihood of a given 
IPO having a highly compensated CEO, and a second modeling of the likelihood of having large 
disparity in the pay distribution of the top management team. In the second stage of our selection 
model, the Inverse Mills Ratios (IMR) from each probit model is included as an additional variable 
in our baseline Cox model. The results of the second-stage of the selection model are reported in 
Panel B of Table IA5. They show that sample selection bias is not a concern in our baseline 
analysis, because neither of the two IMRs is statistically significant at conventional levels. Also, 
our managerial pay measures continue to be significant. 
 
6. Robustness Check for Endogeneity: Bivariate Probit Estimation 
Having high managerial pay or pay gap is a choice made voluntarily by firms. If this choice 
is based on factors that also affect firm survival, then our analysis could suffer from simultaneity or 
reverse causality. However, this is unlikely because delisting takes place in our data after we 
observe the presence of a highly compensated CEO or large pay disparity (i.e., at the pre-IPO fiscal 
year). On the other hand, it is possible that an omitted variable, such as unobservable management 
skills or attitudes toward risk, could drive both firm survival and managerial incentives such that 
the estimated association between firm survival and managerial incentives is spurious. To evaluate 
the empirical relevance of endogeneity in our analysis, we follow Chadwick et al. (2016) and ran a 
bivariate probit model that simultaneously estimates the case of high managerial incentives with a 
model predicting firm survival.  A desirable feature of the bivariate probit model is that it is always 
identified through its functional form (Wilde, 2000). 
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In our bivariate probit estimations in Table IA6, either for the CEO pay of the pay gap, the 
Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the selection and outcome equations are independent. 
Moreover, the coefficients of the managerial pay measures continue to be negative and statistically 
significant. Therefore, endogeneity does not seem to be a concern for inferences regarding the 
relationship of the managerial incentives (CEO pay and pay disparity) and firm survival. 
 
7. Market Perceptions and IPO Compensation Arrangements 
7.1 Factor Regressions 
A natural question that arises from the performance implications of compensation packages 
of IPO executives is whether the market accurately prices absolute and relative CEO pay and how 
these perceptions might vary for the optimal contracting and the managerial power hypothesis, 
respectively. 
In the absence of information asymmetry and under a regime of fully rational investors, the 
perceptions of market participants about the consequences of executive compensation arrangements 
should be fully incorporated during the initiation of trading. However, in a setting where the stock 
market is not always completely efficient, it is likely that it does not fully incorporate the effect of 
compensation packages instantaneously but only gradually over time (as the information 
asymmetry about the manager’s abilities and future actions). In that case, one should observe 
differences in the long-run stock return performance of firms with higher versus lower absolute and 
relative CEO pay. Therefore, under optimal contracting, firms with better compensated CEO or 
high pay gaps within the top management team will also be characterized with higher future stock 
returns. On the contrary, if these arrangements are the symptom of weak governance structures, 
firms with such compensation packages are expected to underperform in the stock market.  
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We assess the evaluation made by external investors using the four factor model of Carhart 
(1997) in order to calculate the abnormal stock returns for the IPO firms.
24
 Following Chemmanur 
and Yan (2017), we assign each IPO to a portfolio on a monthly basis and each IPO firm will be 
held in the portfolio in a holding period of two and a half years starting from the end of the sixth 
month after the IPO offer date. We avoid the first six months after the IPO offer date in order to 
better understand how compensation and tournament incentive affect the long run 
underperformance of IPO firms. At the end of each holding period, the IPO firm drops out of the 
portfolio. We then calculate the equally weighted returns for each portfolio in each calendar month. 
The results are presented in Table IA7 with total CEO compensation and firm pay gap 
measured in year t-1. In Panel A of Table IA7 we run the four factor regression using the whole 
sample of IPO firms. In Panel B and C, we create two portfolios for the IPO firms with high and 
low compensated CEOs and two portfolios those with high and low pay gaps. We run separate 
regressions for these four portfolios. Our results show that the high compensated (pay gap) 
portfolio earns a positive abnormal return, while the low compensated (pay gap) portfolio earns a 
negative abnormal return over the two and a half years horizon subsequent to the IPO offer date. In 
both cases, the hedge (high-low) portfolio earns a positive abnormal return which is significant at 
the ten percent level. Overall, these results provide some support to the hypothesis that the market 
misprices the implications of managerial pay incentives in the post-IPO market.  
 
7.2 Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns 
In the main text, we calculated long-run abnormal stock returns for IPO firms using factor 
models. In this section, we compute long-run abnormal stock returns using buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR). We compute BHAR as the return on a buy-and-hold investment in the IPO firm 
less the return on a buy-and-hold investment: 
                                                          
24
 The main advantage of the factor models is that eliminate the problem of cross-sectional dependence among sample 
firms since their inference is derived from the time series of monthly calendar-time portfolios. 
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We compute BHAR for the one-year, two-year and three-year holding periods. Firms are 
included in the computation for the full holding period or until the IPO firm is delisted. In Panel B 
and C of Table IA8 we examine whether the managerial incentive measures affect stock 
performance in a multivariate setting. The results reveal that managerial pay is positively related 
with future stock performance. 
 
8. The Effect of Managerial Incentives on Post-IPO Investment Policies 
 The analysis on the operating performance implication of managerial pay in the main text 
implies that firms with better compensated CEOs or larger pay gaps select value enhancing projects 
and implement them more efficiently than their counterparts. However, it does not provide any 
indications about the nature of these projects. A value enhancing project can have either a short-
term or long-term investment horizon. Further, if we assume decreasing returns to scale, better 
projects are those characterized by a larger net present value (NPV) for any given scale, which in 
turn, requires a larger equilibrium scale of investment. Therefore, how might our measures of 
managerial pay affect investment patterns? 
 According to the optimal contracting view there are two possible scenarios. On the one 
hand, it is possible that, given their human capital or stronger managerial incentives, managers with 
higher absolute and relative pay will be associated with a larger equilibrium scale of investment 
and will pursue more risky long-term strategies in order to enhance the firm’s long-term viability 
(Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). However, it is also possible that these managers will be engaged 
in less risky and/or short-term strategies. This might be the case if we consider that the main 
priority of IPOs is not to maximize profitability, but rather to ensure its survival in the form of 
prolonged access to finance provided by capital markets (Klepper, 2002). In addition, one should 
keep in mind how damaging a failed IPO could be for the labour market of executives. As 
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Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) argue, managerial concerns for reputation often result in 
conservatism in project choice. 
To investigate these hypotheses, we investigate how capital expenditure and R&D expenses 
vary with the level of CEO compensation and CEO pay gap. As in the case of operating 
performance, we consider both the average level and changes of these variables over the next three 
years after the IPO. Panel A of Table IA9 shows a positive but insignificant relationship between 
our managerial pay measure and the level of both capital expenditures and R&D expenses. Panel B 
reveals that while firms with higher managerial pay gap are positively related with changes in 
capital and R&D expenditures, only relative CEO pay is significant. As such, it seems that while 
firms with higher managerial pay do not necessarily select larger scale projects, one actual channel 
though which they may increase firm value is through investing in risky long-term projects. 
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Table IA1: Descriptive Statistics 
The Table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of U.S. IPOs over the period from 2000 to 2012. Total CEO Pay and  
its’ components are presented in Panel A. CEO characteristics are illustrated in Panel B. Firm and offering characteristics are 
reported in Panel C. Tests of differences in means between the two sub-samples of IPO firms with large pay disparity and 
those with small pay disparity are based on t-tests. The number of observations for each variable is 1,178. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: CEO Pay Components 
 IPOs with large pay gaps IPOs with small pay haps Difference 
 Mean Mean p-value 
CEO Total Pay  $2,181,300 $413,400 0.0000 
Salary/Total Pay  0.35 0.69 0.0000 
Bonus/Total Pay 0.19 0.13 0.0000 
Stock Awards/Total Pay 0.05 0.02 0.0000 
Option Awards/Total Pay 0.25 0.09 0.0000 
Non-Equity Incentive 
Pay/Total Pay 
0.06 0.04 0.0003 
Other Pay/Total Pay 0.08 0.04 0.0000 
Panel B: CEO Characteristics 
CEO Tenure 3.94 4.05 0.6997 
CEO Duality 0.60 0.49 0.0009 
Founder 0.20 0.42 0.0000 
CEO Ownership 12.60 12.80 0.1672 
CEO Age 50.69 48.25 0.0000 
Generalist 0.62 0.57 0.0655 
Panel C: Firm and Offering Characteristics 
Firm Age 18.89 11.66 0.0000 
Proceeds 242.37 199.28 0.3524 
Size 5.20 4.38 0.0000 
Capital Expenditure 0.05 0.04 0.0471 
R&D Intensity 0.27 0.32 0.0480 
Leverage 0.35 0.33 0.5617 
EPS 0.54 0.45 0.0013 
Initial Returns 17.70 26.74 0.0010 
Overhang 4.11 4.81 0.0936 
Board Governance -0.03 -0.03 0.6910 
HHI 0.30 0.30 0.8609 
Big 4 Auditor 0.84 0.81 0.0861 
VC 0.41 0.64 0.0000 
Underwriter 0.42 0.28 0.0000 
Technology 0.34 0.45 0.0000 
Internet  0.10 0.12 0.3084 
Nasdaq 0.62 0.81 0.0000 
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Table IA2: Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) Model 
This Table shows the estimation results of the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model. Our dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the time to delist (survival time) which is measured in months. The Weibull distribution 
was selected based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Time ratios are the exponentiated coefficients, 
exp(β), and measure the extent to which changes in covariates accelerate or decelerate the occurrence of event 
(delisting). A time ratio of above (below) one indicates that an increase in the covariate increases (reduces) the 
survival time. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. Z-statistics 
are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Time Ratio Coefficient Time Ratio 
Total CEO Pay 
0.19*** 
(4.99) 
1.209   
Total Pay Gap 
 
 
0.14*** 
(5.04) 
1.150 
CEO Tenure 
-0.03*** 
(-4.87) 
0.965 
-0.03*** 
(-3.92) 
0.969 
CEO Duality 
1.92*** 
(20.06) 
6.794 
1.79*** 
(17.59) 
6.015 
Founder 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
0.989 
0.08 
(0.82) 
1.085 
CEO Ownership 
-0.02 
(-0.58) 
0.983 
-0.05 
(-1.49) 
0.951 
Initial Returns 
-0.01*** 
(-4.65) 
0.997 
-0.01*** 
(-3.31) 
0.997 
Big 4 Auditor 
-0.29 
(-2.61) 
0.748 
0.21** 
(1.75) 
1.234 
Leverage 
-0.11 
(-1.15) 
0.989 
-0.21** 
(2.13) 
0.812 
Size 
-0.18*** 
(-5.68) 
0.837 
-0.19*** 
(5.63) 
0.821 
EPS 
0.15* 
(1.96) 
1.169 
0.15* 
(1.72) 
1.166 
VC 
-0.23** 
(-2.45) 
0.792 
-0.23** 
(-2.17) 
0.793 
Technology 
0.27*** 
(2.76) 
1.316 
0.22** 
(2.00) 
1.245 
Internet 
0.04 
(0.32) 
1.039 
-0.05 
(-0.33) 
0.955 
Underwriter 
0.45*** 
(4.87) 
1.566 
0.49*** 
(4.92) 
1.630 
Nasdaq 
-0.51*** 
(5.09) 
0.601 
-0.63*** 
(-5.72) 
0.532 
Overhang 
-0.01 
(0.59) 
0.997 
-0.01 
(-0.52) 
0.997 
Market Return 
0.33 
(0.37) 
1.397 
0.63 
(0.65) 
1.886 
Board Governance 
0.13*** 
(5.84) 
1.140 
0.16*** 
(6.64) 
1.177 
HHI 
0.30** 
(2.44) 
1.350 
0.36*** 
(2.75) 
1.441 
Capital Expenditure 
0.77 
(1.59) 
2.166 
0.73 
(1.30) 
2.073 
R&D Intensity 
-0.56*** 
(6.51) 
0.571 
-0.53*** 
(5.66) 
0.585 
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
   (         )  796.11  674.38  
Number of Observations 1,178  1,178  
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250415 
69 
 
Table IA3: Additional Analysis 
This Table displays the multivariate analysis using the Cox Proportional Hazards Models using alternative definitions of delisted 
firms and survivorship. The sample consists of IPOs from 2000 to 2012 in the U.S. stock market. Panel A and B display the 
results for total compensation and firm pay gap from the Cox models, respectively. Specifications (1), (2), (3), and (4) present 
the results of the Cox model using the alternative measures of failed firms. To define the first alternative measure, we follow the 
method of Espenlaub et al. (2016) and use the following four measures to test the performance of the firms before their IPO: cash 
to total assets, total liabilities to total assets, operating income to total assets, current assets to current liabilities. To define the 
second alternative measure, we follow the same procedure and use the four performance measures before their M&A. In the third 
alternative definition, failed companies are only the dropped (delisting code from 500 to 599). Lastly, following Bhattacharya et 
al. (2015), we classify a firm as survivor if it is still listed within three years after its IPO. Panel C and D present the Cox results 
using initially the mean of other top executives to calculate the pay gap instead of the median, and then the CEO Pay Slice. Z-
statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: The Association Between Total CEO Compensation and Failure Risk using Alternative Measures of Failure Risk 
 
First Alternative 
Definition 
Second Alternative 
Definition 
Third Alternative 
Definition 
Fourth Alternative 
Definition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Coefficient 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Coefficient 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Coefficient 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.19*** 
(-2.91) 
0.827 
-0.28*** 
(-3.52) 
0.756 
-0.39** 
(-2.34) 
0.677 
-0.07* 
(-1.72) 
0.932 
Control Variables Y  Y  Y  Y  
Industry & Year 
FE 
Y  Y  Y  Y  
Chi-Square 279.65  229.41  131.41  301.18  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  1,178  1,315  
Panel B: The Association Between Total Pay Gap and Failure Risk using Alternative Measures of Failure Risk 
 
First Alternative 
Definition 
Second Alternative 
Definition 
Third Alternative 
Definition 
Fourth Alternative 
Definition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Coefficient 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Coefficient 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Coefficient 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Total Pay Gap 
-0.15** 
(-2.31) 
0.861 
-0.18*** 
(-2.80) 
0.835 
-0.23* 
(-1.92) 
0.795 
-0.06* 
(-1.73) 
0.942 
Control Variables Y  Y  Y  Y  
Industry & Year 
FE 
Y  Y  Y  Y  
Chi-Square 227.24  158.42  111.50  372.35  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  1,178  1,315  
Panel C: Firm Pay Gap using the Mean Compensation instead of the Median Compensation of Other Senior Executives 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Time Ratio 
Total Pay Gap 
-0.14** 
(-2.13) 
0.869 
0.12*** 
(4.94) 
1.127 
Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 218.72  624.77  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  
Panel D: CEO Slice as an Alternative Measure of Pay Gap 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Time Ratio 
Total Pay Gap 
-0.43* 
(-1.69) 
0.651 
0.44** 
(2.45) 
1.553 
Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 263.61  768.07  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  
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Table IA4: Robustness Analysis  
This Table displays the multivariate analysis using the Cox Proportional Hazards Models with alternative industry definitions. 
Panel A illustrates the estimation of the Cox model using total CEO compensation as the main independent variable while Panel B 
reports the results of the Cox model using Pay Gap as the main independent variable. Models (1) and (2) are results using 
alternative industry classifications (FF-30 and FF-49).  Model (3) shows the result without industry fixed effects. The sample 
consists of IPOs from 2000 to 2012 in the U.S. stock market. Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. Z-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Alternative Industry Definitions for Total CEO Compensation (Pay) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient. Hazard Ratio 
Total CEO 
Compensation 
-0.15*** 
(-3.81) 
0.864 
-0.15*** 
(-3.99) 
0.856 
-0.12*** 
(-3.43) 
 0.883 
Control Variables Y  Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  Y  
Chi-Square 576.17  589.37  537.76  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  1,178  
Panel B: Alternative Industry Definitions for Pay Gap 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
Total Firm Gap 
-0.10*** 
(-3.59) 
0.904 
-0.10*** 
(-3.65) 
0.900 
-0.10*** 
(-3.74) 
 0.903 
Control Variables Y  Y    
Industry & Year FE Y  Y    
Chi-Square 490.05  503.05  459.84  
Number of 
Observations 
1,178  1,178  1,178  
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Table IA5: Heckman-Two Step Model 
This Table shows the estimation results of the Heckman Two-Step Model. Panel A presents the First-Stage results (probit models) while 
Panel B displays the second stage results (outcome) including Inverse Mills Ratios from Panel A as additional variables. Our dependent 
variables in Panel A are the Highly compensated CEOs and Large Pay Gaps, respectively. Highly compensated CEOs is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the CEOs have greater compensation than the sample median. Large pay gap is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firms have pay disparity greater than the sample median. Our dependent variable in Panel B is whether or not a firm survived five years 
after its IPO***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: First Stage Results 
Dependent Variable Firms with Highly Compensated CEOs Firms with Large Pay Gap 
CEO Tenure 
0.01 
(0.26) 
-0.01 
(-1.29) 
CEO Duality 
0.27*** 
(2.60) 
0.12 
(1.14) 
Founder 
-0.35*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.25** 
(-2.27) 
CEO Ownership 
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.09*** 
(2.62) 
Big 4 Auditor 
0.08 
(0.85) 
0.07 
(0.79) 
Leverage 
-0.29** 
(-2.26) 
-0.10 
(-0.86) 
Size 
0.34*** 
(7.87) 
0.17*** 
(4.23) 
EPS 
0.05 
(0.51) 
-0.08 
(-0.84) 
VC 
-0.06 
(-0.48) 
-0.39*** 
(-3.36) 
Technology 
-0.20 
(-1.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
Internet 
0.05 
(0.32) 
0.30** 
(1.98) 
Underwriter 
0.31*** 
(2.77) 
0.20* 
(1.86) 
Nasdaq 
-0.05 
(-0.36) 
0.07 
(0.53) 
Board Governance 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
0.02 
(0.88) 
HHI 
-0.13 
(-0.82) 
-0.38** 
(-2.46) 
Capital Expenditure 
0.84 
(1.31) 
0.42 
(0.68) 
R&D Intensity 
-0.18 
(-1.62) 
-0.05 
(-0.53) 
Industry & Year FE Y Y 
          0.1886 0.0959 
Number of Observations 1,178 1,178 
Panel B: Second-Stage Results 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.15*** 
(-3.89) 
0.860 
  
Total Pay Gap 
  -0.10*** 
(-3.47) 
0.907 
Inverse Mills (Total CEO 
Pay) 
-0.05 
(-0.15) 
   
Inverse Mills (Total Pay Gap) 
  -0.40 
(-0.44) 
 
Control Variables Y  Y  
Industry & Year FE Y  Y  
Chi-Square 51.78  485.19  
Number of Observations 1,178  1,178  
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250415 
72 
 
Table IA6: Bivariate Probit Estimation 
This Table shows the estimation results of the Bivariate Probit Estimation. Failure risk is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm 
failed to survive five years after its IPO. Highly compensated CEOs is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEOs have greater 
compensation than the sample median. Large firm gap is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms have pay disparity greater than 
the sample median. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Failure Risk 
High Total CEO 
Compensation 
Failure Risk Large Firm Gap 
Total CEO Pay 
-0.20** 
(-2.55) 
   
Total Pay Gap   
-0.14** 
(-2.45) 
 
CEO Tenure 
-0.09*** 
(-7.35) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
-0.08*** 
(-6.62) 
-0.01 
(-1.03) 
CEO Duality 
0.08 
(0.78) 
0.21** 
(2.16) 
0.04 
(0.42) 
0.10 
(1.12) 
Founder 
-0.05 
(-0.48) 
-0.26** 
(-2.47) 
-0.11 
(-0.11) 
-0.15 
(-1.55) 
Big 4 Auditor 
0.03 
(0.39) 
0.09 
(1.02) 
0.06 
(0.67) 
0.06 
(0.55) 
Leverage 
-0.05 
(-0.44) 
-0.30** 
(-2.34) 
-0.01 
(-0.11) 
-0.05 
(-0.42) 
Size 
-0.01 
(-0.42) 
0.30*** 
(6.95) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
0.14*** 
(3.81) 
EPS 
-0.10 
(-1.09) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.09 
(-0.94) 
-0.06 
(-0.67) 
VC 
0.08 
(0.75) 
0.07 
(0.66) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.30*** 
(-2.87) 
Technology 
0.27*** 
(2.64) 
-0.27*** 
(-2.74) 
0.30*** 
(2.71) 
-0.03 
(-0.36) 
Internet 
0.26* 
(1.83) 
0.13 
(0.87) 
0.26 
(1.57) 
0.38** 
(2.57) 
Underwriter 
0.08 
(0.75) 
0.37*** 
(3.48) 
0.15 
(1.29) 
0.25** 
(2.43) 
Nasdaq 
0.15 
(1.17) 
-0.03 
(-0.25) 
0.19 
(1.41) 
0.04 
(0.32) 
Board Governance 
0.89 
(1.57) 
-0.13 
(-0.24) 
0.89 
(1.42) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
HHI 
0.16 
(1.09) 
-0.20 
(-1.36) 
0.13 
(0.86) 
-0.41*** 
(-2.86) 
Capital Expenditure 
-0.46 
(-0.82) 
0.51 
(0.85) 
-0.27 
(-0.46) 
0.26 
(0.45) 
R&D Intensity 
-0.08 
(-0.74) 
-0.16 
(-1.57) 
-0.07 
(-0.62) 
-0.04 
(-0.44) 
Generalist 
0.05 
(0.49) 
0.11 
(1.11) 
0.04 
(0.42) 
-0.06 
(-0.70) 
CEO Age 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.02*** 
(2.67) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.67) 
Wald Test (p-value)  0.655 (0.4185)  2.368 (0.1238) 
Number of Observations 1,178 1,178 1,178 1,178 
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Table IA7: Four Factor Regressions 
This Table reports the results from Carhart’s (1997) four-factor regressions for portfolios of IPO firms based on Total CEO Pay 
and Pay Gap of the year prior to the IPO. Portfolios with high or low total CEO pay (total pay gap) are those with Total CEO 
Compensation (Total Pay Gap) above or below the sample median, respectively. The regression model is:(       )     
  (       )                          . Rpm is the monthly portfolio returns, Rfm is the one-month T-bill 
return, (Rkm-Rfm) is the monthly market risk premium. SMBm is the return on the small firms minus the return on the large firms in 
month m, and HMLm is the return on the high book-to-market stocks minus the return on the low book-to-market stocks, and 
UMDm is the return on the high momentum stocks minus the return on the low momentum stocks. ap is the monthly risk-adjusted 
abnormal return in percent and βp, sp, hp, and up are factor loadings. T-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Portfolio consists of all IPO firms 
All IPO firms ap Market SMB HML UMD 
 -0.002 
(-1.26) 
1.239*** 
(20.15) 
0.882*** 
(11.34) 
-0.460*** 
(-5.35) 
-0.257*** 
(-5.35) 
Panel B: Portfolios are sorted by Total CEO Pay 
High Total CEO Pay Portfolio 
0.005* 
(1.95) 
1.154*** 
(19.52) 
0.748*** 
(10.00) 
-0.304*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.278*** 
(-6.01) 
Low Total CEO Pay Portfolio 
-0.008 
(-1.04) 
1.331*** 
(16.99) 
1.037*** 
(10.45) 
-0.612*** 
(-6.13) 
-0.210*** 
(-3.43) 
High-Low Total CEO Pay 
0.013* 
(2.05) 
-0.177 
(-1.04) 
-0.288** 
(-2.12) 
0.299*** 
(3.59) 
-0.059 
(0.55) 
Panel C: Portfolios are sorted by Total Pay Gap 
High Pay Gap Portfolio 
0.004* 
(1.92) 
1.193*** 
(18.46) 
0.855*** 
(10.46) 
-0.456*** 
(-5.54) 
-0.306*** 
(-6.06) 
Low Pay Gap Portfolio 
-0.006* 
(1.85) 
1.297*** 
(18.21) 
0.949*** 
(10.52) 
-0.462*** 
(-5.09) 
-0.196*** 
(-3.52) 
High-Low Total Pay Gap 
0.011* 
(1.74) 
-0.104* 
(-1.75) 
-0.093 
(-1.24) 
0.006 
(0.07) 
-0.110** 
(-2.37) 
 
Table IA8: Managerial Incentives and BHAR 
This Table shows the results of additional tests using post-IPO volatility measures. Panel A and C present the results of the impact 
of total CEO compensation and total pay gap on Post-IPO Performance. The dependent variable BHAR is the 12-, 24- and 36 
month (depending on the specification) buy-and-hold return calculated from the price at the end of the firm’s first day of trading 
through the end of the specified return window. Columns (1), (2) and (3) report results for multivariate regressions of the 12-, 24-, 
and 36-month post-IPO buy-and-hold returns. BHAR12, BHAR24, BHAR36 are adjusted for the one, two, and three year buy-and-
hold value-weighted index return. T-statistics are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors and clustered by industry and year. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Impact of Total Compensation on Post-IPO Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Total CEO Compensation 
0.03* 
(1.79) 
0.07 
(1.20) 
0.12* 
(1.76) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 705 634 596 
Adjusted    0.1536 0.1520 0.1240 
Panel B: Impact of Total Firm Gap on Post-IPO Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Total Firm Gap 
0.01 
(1.60) 
0.01** 
(2.20) 
0.03*** 
(2.67) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 705 634 596 
Adjusted    0.1352 0.1209 0.1483 
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Table IA9: The Effect of Managerial Incentives on Firm Investment Policies 
This Table shows the results of additional tests using post-IPO investment outcomes as dependent variables. Panel A and B display 
the results of the impact of total CEO compensation and Firm Pay Gap, respectively. R&D is the ratio of research and development 
expenses to total assets. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. ΔR&D is the change in the levels of R&D 
between each post-issue year and the pre-IPO fiscal year. ΔCAPEX is the change in the levels of CAPEX between each post-issue 
year and the pre-IPO fiscal year. All performance measures are industry adjusted at the two-digit SIC (Standard Industry 
Classification) system and averaged over the next three years after the IPO.Control variables are the same as in Table 3. T-statistics 
are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by industry and year. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Impact of Total CEO Pay on Firm Investment Policies 
 R&D CAPEX ΔR&D ΔCAPEX 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total CEO Pay 
0.01  
(1.25) 
0.07 
(1.64) 
0.05** 
(2.36) 
0.05 
(1.37) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
N 588 588 497 497 
Adjusted    0.6233 0.5825 0.2755 0.1655 
Panel B: Impact of Total Pay Gap on Post-Operating Performance 
 R&D CAPEX ΔR&D ΔCAPEX 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Pay Gap 
0.01 
(1.44) 
0.01  
(1.56) 
0.02** 
(2.30) 
0.09 
(1.59) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
N 588 588 497 497 
Adjusted    0.6264 0.6269 0.2727 0.1544 
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Appendix IA: Figures 
Figure 1: Components of Total CEO Compensation 
 
Figure 2a: Survival Function of IPO Firms with a Highly (blue) or a 
Poorly Compensated CEO (red) 
Figure 2b: Survival Estimates of IPO Firms with a Highly 
(blue) or a Poorly Compensated CEO (red) 
  
Figure 3a: Survival Function of IPO Firms with Large (blue) or 
Small (red) Pay Disparities 
Figure 3b: Survival Estimates of IPO Firms with Large (blue) or 
Small (red) Pay Disparities 
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